

# Drug Policy in the Americas:

A REDEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM  
AND THE STATE'S ROLE





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**Oliver D. Meza, Edgar Guerra**



**Prepared by the Drug Policy Program  
of the Center for Economic Research and Teaching (CIDE)  
for the Open Society Foundation (OSEF).**



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# Legal



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# Prologue

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Drug policy is being subject to global revision like never before in the 100 years of the current prohibitionist regime. Governments, academic institutions, society in general, and international organizations are devoting more and more energy to analyzing the existing data—some of which worse than others—in order to assess existing drug policies throughout the world. The policy debate around one drug policy versus another seems to be, at first glance, robust and vibrant. However, the vast majority of political, diplomatic, academic, and social debate overlooks what should be at the heart of the review of public policies on drugs and the construction of new alternatives. The way we approach—or ignore—key questions that need to be answered in evaluating or formulating public policy leaves much to be desired. What is the public problem that a drug policy seeks to solve? What should the objectives of a public intervention be? How do we evaluate the success or failure of an intervention? If we do not respond to these basic questions with at least moderate clarity, neither the technical evaluation nor the normative articulation of drug policy will match the seriousness of the topic.

Discussions will fall within the tired rhetoric, and interventions will continue to be little more than a channel for prejudice and intuition if we do not carry out an open and informed discussion about these questions at the current juncture. If we face this challenge by opening the discussion on these three key points, perhaps we can construct more rational public policies and move past dogmatic positions: dogma affirms its own conclusion without making its premises explicit and without offering the arguments and evidence needed to sustain them. At the start of the Drug Policy Program (DPP) two years ago, we committed to exploring the idea of constructing an analytical framework that puts these questions at the center of the discussion. Our position was that the mere exercise of trying to elucidate their answers would contribute to the construction of the drug policy analysis field. To be perfectly honest, the task seemed like a challenge beyond our abilities. But we assumed that, by facing it, we would develop the skills that are so lacking in the field that concerns us today.

Two years have gone by since the beginning of this exercise. Today, we can say that we were right in both respects: the challenge proved to exceed our abilities, and our task gave us the opportunity to develop these abilities. Very early on, when the talks were confined to our relatively homogeneous group of DPP partners, it became clear that the challenge was beyond us. The differences in the ways we identified and understood the facts, and in the way we assessed their relative weight, surprised us all. When we reached a


functional equilibrium, we went beyond the initial group and opened the discussion to a growing circle of actors. After that, the complexity that emerged manifested itself fully. Fortunately, the project's leaders led us well, and today we can offer what we believe is a solid foundation for the development of a discussion that is now recognized as inevitable: how do we evaluate drug policies in a way that allows us, in our different latitudes, to improve them?

It is hard to believe that after 100 years of building an international regime, we are just now starting to sketch answers to these basic questions. For many, this can be a daunting task. But in the DPP we believe that there is no other way to cross the stasis of the field. We have to try what has not been tried before and commit to correcting the failures of the past. The consensus on drug policy has been broken. In general, this is a good thing, because it opens the doors to a much-needed revision of everything that has been done so far. Trying to build global shared goals again is probably impossible and may not be desirable. However, the exercise of discussing and trying to find shared goals will undoubtedly contribute to better understanding what has been done, what is being done, and what can be done in the future to reduce the harm of the problematic use of certain drugs and to prevent the damage that many interventions and public policies have on millions of lives every day.

**PhD. Alejandro Madrazo Lajous**

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
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# Executive Summary

Drug Policy in the Americas:  
A redefinition of the problem and the state's role

1. The central problem is defined as a situation that imposes unnecessary, avoidable risks on citizens regarding the drug phenomenon. This definition requires the state to take a proactive role in the reform and set up of institutions and policies to reduce these risks. This situation is borne out by its effects, of which there are at least three: a) a critical negative effect on public health indices, b) a delegitimized state, c) high social and economic costs associated with the drug phenomenon.
2. Four reasons behind the central problem have been identified. These are a) psychoactive substance markets operating within a framework that fails to provide effective control, b) insufficient information on the drug phenomenon, c) the enormous power of organized crime, which the state is unable to combat, d) inefficient government institutions that are inflexible as regards the drug phenomenon.
3. We use the Problem Tree technique to identify some of the elements that help guide countries' actions towards a more comprehensive drug policy in order to address the central problem defined here. This procedure was undertaken with a large group of participants from various sectors such as think-tanks and the government and academic specialists on drug-related issues.


**Figure 1.1 Problem and objectives tree**



Source: Compiled by the authors

4. The problem tree technique also serves to articulate a theory of change, which may be useful for monitoring countries' performance. In other words, we wish to determine the effects of the actions implemented by national governments as drug policies. This monitoring over time tests the Theory of Change originally proposed to reduce the avoidable risks to which citizens are exposed as a result of the drug phenomenon. Which or what kind of drug policy is most effective in protecting citizens from preventable risks? The answer to this will be obtained from the countries' experiences and the indicators designed to monitor them.
5. We apply the prototype to countries in the Americas. Although we encountered major information challenges, we were able to identify some interesting relationships. In a snapshot of a sample of countries (those with the most available data), we found a positive link between the level of their states' capacity to avoid unnecessary risks, measured by the four previously identified causes, and the level of these goals measured through public health indicators, state legitimacy, and social and economic costs.

Figure 1.2 Capacity of states to avoid unnecessary risks



Source: Compiled by the authors

6. The potential of the platform of indicators proposed here goes beyond a mere snapshot. The platform seeks to systematically gather information from countries in order to determine their performance in addressing the drug problem over time.

# Introduction

What should the state's role be in regards to the drug phenomenon? How would it be possible to determine the progress of public policies insofar as they protect citizens from the drug phenomenon as currently structured? We attempt to answer these questions, and pose others, in order to directly influence public drug policies in countries where international and national institutions currently have a regime of prohibition. It should be noted that to date, this regime has not fulfilled the promises made or the expectations raised years ago. On the contrary, it has created collateral problems, not only undermining the state's capacity to address this phenomenon but also other equally pressing ones.

This report is an attempt, based on the best available evidence, to develop a conceptual proposal for the state's role in response to a new definition of the drug problem. The conceptual proposal is accompanied by a policy analysis technique to form a platform of indicators to monitor drug policies in the Americas. In countries in the Americas, it is difficult to find a homologous, integral drug policy in terms of scope and perspectives. Although there are many reasons for this, we will focus on two. First of all, the drug phenomenon and the definition of the societal problem related to this phenomenon differ at the regional and sometimes even national level. For example, Mexico is a country involved in the production, use, distribution and transport of drugs, meaning that the problem must be defined from a drug trafficking perspective.

The situation is different in countries that are mainly users. There, the problem is addressed from a perspective aimed at eradicating illegal drug sales and use. In other words, although drug policies are largely prohibitionist, their approach varies according to national contexts and the specific problems they face, whether production, transport, sale or use. Second, a broad international debate has concluded that the state's role in combating the drug phenomenon goes beyond security to encompass health issues, institutions and community, which is why the interventions and decisions made by national governments internationally are becoming increasingly diversified.

Given the diversity of drug policies (although most are articulated within a prohibitionist paradigm) and the range of attendant problems triggered by the drug phenomenon, it is difficult to identify a single regional drug policy and accordingly more complicated to construct a monitoring platform. In light of the above, the conceptual and technical proposal we present is designed so that regardless of the region or country, the platform is able to monitor the various different drug policies. Therefore, in order to find common ground on which to build a monitoring platform, we raise two questions: How can we construct a public problem that reflects the diversity of public policies, yet at the same time specifically concerns the drug problem?

The issue of drug policies is necessarily linked to political and ideological positions that polarize the debate and elicit more disagreement than consensus. The purpose of this paper is therefore not to exacerbate the conflict by proposing a regional drug policy, but rather to contribute to the discussion by proposing a platform of indicators to monitor policies (plural) regardless of their political and ideological background. This report begins with the internationally recognized framework of human rights, and is premised on the fact that existing drug policies (1) are insufficient since they are based almost exclusively on a logic of security and (2) make citizens vulnerable because of the risks entailed by a prohibitionist policy.

To develop the proposal, the methodology used was an adaptation of the logical framework. This is an expanded analytical tool used to deconstruct complex problems and design public policies that provides a common language to encourage participation among people with widely differing perspectives. The assumptions behind each of these give rise to the theory of change. In other words, to the extent that they are empirically achieved, on the basis of qualitative (behavioral change) and quantitative evidence (performance indicators and result), this will prove whether the construction of assumptions was successful and therefore confirm the theory behind them.

During the first stage, an interdisciplinary team of academics from the Center for Economic Research and Teaching (CIDE) Central Region was formed to define the problem of the drug phenomenon and related issues. This exercise led to the construction of a problem tree, which is the basic input for the study. The problem tree identifies a central problem<sup>1</sup> and related issues divided by cause and effect<sup>2</sup>. Each of the topics (cause-effect) are part of the overall conceptual framework subsequently developed by each academic expert on the subject, to consolidate the assumptions behind the definition of the problem.

The following activity involved organizing focus groups with experts with different profiles and positions in relation to the issues identified in the overall framework, such as health, violence, deregulated markets, social costs and delegitimized state. A total of 12 sessions were held with 54 participants. The questions guiding the focus groups were designed to identify four general aspects of each topic related to the drug phenomenon: public problems, causal effects, solutions and indicators. It is important to note that the focus group sessions were videotaped and transcribed for analytical purposes, while ensuring participants' total anonymity.

1 Central problem: The state exposes its citizens to avoidable risks in the drug phenomenon.

2 Causes: a) psychotropic substance market operating outside a legal framework to regulate them b) insufficient, deficient information on the drug phenomenon 3) enormous power of organized crime that the state is unable to combat 4) ineffective government institutions that are inflexible as regards the drug phenomenon.

Effects: a) negative, critical effect on public health indices b) high social and economic costs 3) State whose actions lack legitimacy.

The first result of the systematization of the information from the focus groups was to identify useful indicators for monitoring drug policy. The second result was the definition of the components comprising each of the themes in the general conceptual framework, as discussed in the focus groups. Parallel to these activities, national and international statistical databases were explored, together with institutional documents to draw up an inventory of ideal (proposed) and current indicators related to the drug phenomenon from the perspective stated in the problem tree. These exercises led to the development of the expanded conceptual framework to ensure that the platform indicators were methodologically sound. The objective tree<sup>3</sup> (means-ends) and the elements comprising each of the components were subsequently defined.

The following activity involved assigning indicators to each of the elements of the components. In order to choose the indicators, two criteria were considered: in general, indicators from international databases were used to ensure the periodicity of their updating and the broadest possible geographical coverage. In particular, if the ideal indicator did not exist, “proxies” were identified that were at least partly linked to the element (s) of the component.

Lastly, in order to draw up the first version of the indicator platform, a total of 35 countries in the Americas and the latest time series of each of the chosen indicators were considered. Accordingly, this first document leaves work to be done to empirically and technically consolidate the indicator platform. On the one hand, it is necessary to deepen the field analysis of specific experiences and realities while on the other, it will be necessary to have a more robust statistical base to observe behaviors and possible future paths. However, the report presented establishes the theoretical and conceptual foundations required to advance the research agenda in the field and contribute to the debate in the political arena through the dissemination of solid arguments on the basis of the perspective proposed in this paper.

After the introductory section, the document is divided into three parts. Part I refers to the new definition of the problem. This section discusses the effects of the central problem. Part II develops the causal sets which, according to the research team and the findings, creates the central problem. In keeping with the technique employed, Part III uses the construction of the problem to establish the objectives, means and ends which the set of activities included in a policy could pursue in order to address the central problem as previously defined. Part III presents the platform of indicators used to monitor the countries in the Americas as regards the drug problem. It also discusses some of the results.

3 Central objective: A state capable of reducing the risks incurred by citizens as a result of the drug phenomenon.

Means: a) Incorporate the psychoactive substance market into the legal regime to permit its regulation and legislation; b) Increase the production of evidence-based information for citizens on the drug phenomenon and its effects c) Weaken, control or neutralize organized crime d) increase the effectiveness of government institutions.

Ends: a) Improved public health indices; b) Low level of social costs and 3) a state that maintains high levels of legitimacy.

## Background

Measuring drug policies is an endeavor with an extremely interesting and solid background. Previous examples include *Measurement Matters: Designing New Metrics for A Drug Policy That Works* (Igarape, 2015). In this paper, the authors assume the drug issue requires a paradigm shift in the way societies and governments conceive of the drug phenomenon and ways of measuring its effects and consequences within the chain from production through trafficking to consumption. The document presents a set of goals, targets and key indicators to measure both the intended and unintended consequences that inevitably occur as a result of all drug policies. Overall, the document is very important because it attempts to rethink old paradigms and provides fresh perspectives for redesigning, implementing and monitoring effective drug policies.

Within this same logic, the Drug Policy Program (PPD) and the National Laboratory of Public Policy (LNPP) of the Center for Economic Research and Teaching (CIDE) are two units specializing in the design, methods and techniques of scientific research designed to reinforce socially useful knowledge for innovation in public policy (LNPP). The two institutions have combined efforts through the multidisciplinary research project “Drug Policy Indicators” to pave the way for the construction of knowledge that will inform public debate and collective deliberation in the field of illegal psychoactive substances and provide elements for decision makers to construct sustainable, well-founded public policies better suited to the needs of each region and country, and consistent with national problems.

In this vein, the “Drug Policy Indicators” report is a unique effort to develop metrics for measuring drug policies primarily in Mexico and Latin America, adapted to the current context of the problems surrounding illegal drug production, transport, marketing and use in these regions.

This report goes beyond the frontiers of current information and analyses to produce new data and draw up a research agenda to create a methodological platform to evaluate and measure the effects of interventions arising from drug policies in general. This is because we think that in some cases, drug policy objectives can and should be applicable at a regional level. In this regard, on the one hand, the long-term goal is to contribute to the change in drug policy by providing specific parameters useful for various global contexts, integrated into a monitoring indicator. On the other, the medium-term goal is to change the nature of the debate on drug policy through open discussions on the current public problems related to illegal drugs and the public policies that address these problems.

## Questions answered by the report

The report is based on the premise that in the field of drug policy, key questions for achieving good public policy design and building an evaluation platform have yet to be fully answered. Many doubts remain about basic questions, which we will attempt to answer here, such as: What is the public problem when we address the drug phenomenon? What should be the objectives of the intervention (s) be? How does one measure the success of this/these intervention(s)? These questions arise from a gradual political and ideological change, albeit limited as regards its scope and fundamentals, on how to conceive of the drug issue from new perspectives.

## Context of the paradigm shift in the world and Mexico

The Third Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGASS) to review the UN drug control system was held in April 2016. The meeting was convened at the request of a group of Latin American countries -Colombia, Guatemala and Mexico- in order to rethink and reorient drug policy. This session was mainly prompted by the lack of results of the prohibitionist approach; high levels of violence associated with the illicit drug market and the penetration of every sphere of social and public life by organized drug crime.

The meeting raised high expectations. The limits of the initiatives adopted by UNGASS 1990 to develop a coherent drug policy with the whole UN system, particularly the 1998 Session and its goal of “eliminating or significantly reducing” the world illicit drug market by 2008 became apparent as a result of the collateral effects in the most heavily affected countries, especially producers in the Latin American region.

The Special Session failed to achieve the expected impact nor did it involve any surprises or paradigm shifts. However, it became clear that the consensus on prohibition and the most orthodox version of drug policy had collapsed. Moreover, the agreement reached between the participating countries reflected a number of shifts. We will mention two of these.

On the one hand, a new discourse had been incorporated that was a long way from the so-called “war on drugs”. Although this does not mean that the belligerent, exclusionary language of the prohibitionist paradigm has disappeared, it does show greater openness and balance by incorporating aspects such as human rights, public health and development, as borne out by UNGASS’s Outcome Document. The various United Nations agencies that have joined the conversation have played a key role in this task. Indeed, the increased openness shown in the Drug Control Regime and Commission on Narcotic Drugs in Vienna was crucial to UNGASS 2016, in which the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the United National Development Program (UNDP), UN-AIDS, UN Women and UNICEF played a key role. The participation

of these agencies has achieved the successful incorporation of solutions to the drug problem into the discussion with the commitments of states in the field of human rights and the development goals of the 2030 Agenda. Likewise, both the Office United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Board of Narcotics have shown that the Conventions are not necessarily linked to declarations of war or human rights violations or other legislations such as mandatory treatment for users with high-risk use or the death penalty for producers and dealers.

On the other hand, it gives individual member states greater flexibility to design and implement drug policies more in line with national contexts. In this respect, UNGASS has made it possible to open a debate within the countries of the world and Latin America, which has broken the taboo that prevented public and informed discussion on the subject, which was based more on political and ideological prejudice than scientific evidence. Incidentally, this debate has permitted the incorporation of new actors into the discussion- civil society, users and academics- who have contributed not only their expertise on the subject, but also hard data and positions designed to achieve consensus rather than disagreement.

Although UNGASS 2016 left many issues pending, the fact is that the Special Session marked a watershed in the discussion of the drug phenomenon, which open up new avenues for analysis and public discussion.

## Why is a drug policy needed?

The paradigm shift has made it necessary to seriously consider the need to intervene in the drug issue from a more integral perspective. Much of what has been said about the drug issue could easily be applied to development issues in general. For example, the most recent discourse of the United Nations Program for Development indicates the need to view the drug issue from a broader perspective in which fighting drugs does not contradict development objectives (IDPC, 2016).

Although this new approach is necessary, it entails its own risks. On the one hand, replacing anti-drug rhetoric with pro-development discourse provides the opportunity to focus on issues on the agenda that would traditionally have remained hidden. If we think of drugs as a public evil to be eradicated, the obvious strategy would be to organize a fight against producers and users, often involving the use of weapons. But if we regard the drug problem as a development issue, this requires a different strategy that involves thinking about public health issues, market control, reversing information asymmetries and building public institutions. The question with an issue as broad as development is where does drug policy end and development policy begin? The former partly turns into the latter and for governments and decision makers, this line becomes crucially diffuse. Some people could point to the existence of a drug policy being

implemented in each development plan. This provides an opportunity to pretend. In other words, it allows the authorities to say that work has been done when in fact, no specific actions have been taken to address a highly complex problem.

This paper provides a solution to this dilemma: How can one fully understand the issue of drugs, without an explicit, concrete definition by states that makes it possible to reconcile the development agenda with a drug policy one? This document provides a complex new definition of the public problem caused by the issue of psychoactive drugs or substances that are currently illicit. It does so on the basis of a premise about the role the state should play in response to the social interactions that entail enormous risks for citizens. This paper conceives of and designs measures to help mitigate risks in social interactions, and reduce the state of vulnerability to which hundreds of thousands of citizens are exposed. In this respect, the drug market and all the interactions surrounding it involve risks, which subject citizens to varying degrees of vulnerability. The role of the state in response to this problem is mainly to reduce the risks that put citizens in general in a greater state of vulnerability. This role is, in fact, one that the state has historically played in a series of social problems which it cannot control on its own, is unable to eliminate, yet is required to address.<sup>4</sup>

Using the definition of the problem associated with the issue of risks, and the platform indicators presented below, we attempt to provide an opportunity for the various policies, whether prohibitionist or not, in order to be able to use hard data to assess the risk entailed by citizens as a result of various public policies. The risks caused by drug markets over many years, in addition to those inherent in substance use, as pointed out by those opposed to the prohibitionist regime, may be empirically tested over time if we define the role of the state as being to protect its citizens from the greatest possible risk.

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<sup>4</sup> For example, the use of alcohol, tobacco, sugar and other consumables that directly affect users' health. State institutions also reduce the risks that third parties will subject other people's lives and welfare to, such as health or accident insurance, security inspection in the manufacture of pharmaceuticals, automobiles, clothing, cell phones, etc.



02

# Methodological summary


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The project has been organized on the basis of a mixed methodology, both quantitative and qualitative, comprising three phases. It should be noted that regardless of these phases, this type of exercise requires constant improvement, achieved through monitoring and new knowledge produced on the issue. The phases for implementing the findings of this report are as follows:

1. Phase 1. Construction of the problem and development of change theories.
2. Phase 2. Verification of the problem and change theories.
3. Phase 3. Gathering and analysis of information and development of indicator platform.

During Phase 1, a group of CIDE researchers whose lines of research are linked to drug issues, met on a number of occasions. Several discussion sessions yielded a first draft of the definition of the problem using the problem tree and objectives tree technique. This technique is commonly used in the preparation of logical frameworks to guide public policy design, whose elements are subsequently utilized to assess the impacts of these policies.

**Figure 2.1 Problem and objectives tree**



Fuente: Compiled by the authors

The procedure is for participants to brainstorm about the causes and effects of a particular central problem (Figure 1, left side). The central problem takes shape as the group discussion progresses. These discussions mean that the exercise is usually repeated several times until an agreement is reached by the participants on the central problem, its effects and causes. Once this first problem tree has been defined, the objective tree is constructed (see right side of Figure 1). In educational terms, this other tree is the phenomenon of the problem seen in terms of objectives. In other words, while the problem tree is the phenomenon viewed as a problem, the objective tree is the phenomenon seen as the interventions required to solve this problem.

During this same phase, the theoretical framework supporting the previous exercise is drawn up. The problem-objective tree implies an assumption of causality that in principle has not been verified firsthand but on which literature exists to support the causal lines. In Figure 1, the lower squares of the left tree are the causes of the central problem while the central problem produces the aforementioned effects. Likewise, in the objective tree (right), the means are

located in the causes. These are actions that the state, in theory, would have to implement to achieve the overall objective. The overall objective addresses the central problem in such a way that if the problem is that the state exposes its citizens to high levels of risk, the overall objective should be a state able to reduce or maintain minimum risk levels for its citizens. The means promote compliance with the overall objective, while the latter pursues the purposes identified in the top section of the objective tree. Consequently, the purposes are described as the opposite aspect to the consequences.

Phase 2 tests the theory of change formulated in the previous phase. It does so through an exercise that involved an extensive dialogue between various actors specializing in specific issues related to the problem-objectives tree previously developed. Twelve focus groups were organized around the topics yielded by the previous exercise: health, violence, delegitimized state, deregulated markets and social costs. In the focus groups, and for each subject, the discussion revolved around three topics: 1) the construction of conceptual frameworks for the public problem; 2) policy objectives and 3) the selection of monitoring indicators. This phase was crucial to the selection of the 54 participants, the procedure used being purposive sampling. Purposive sampling is designed to select participants on the basis of expertise and experience, in this case, by ensuring the highest possible number of points of views on selected topics. The focus groups, designed to have a maximum length of 120 minutes, were conducted by CIDE professors from the Central Region<sup>5</sup>, experts on each of the topics, during the months of April and July 2016.

Phase 3 involves simultaneous actions. On the one hand, the information gathered in the focus groups is analyzed. This refines the change theories originally developed by a smaller group of researchers in Phase 1. At the same time, using the findings of the focus groups, an exhaustive search was conducted of international databases that might contain potential indicators for the construction of the platform and therefore the empirical part of the change theory. Once this had been done, a conceptual tie was achieved between what had been said in the focus groups and what had been found in the international databases of variables, and the relevant indicators were defined that could provide evidence of the behavior of the phenomenon. This same phase allowed further analyses to be conducted.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> The annexes contain the guidelines used for focus groups and complementary information on their scope and analysis.

<sup>6</sup> The annex section contains a description of the procedure together with a technical explanation of the analysis.





03

# Part I. The problem: The state exposes its citizens to avoidable risks in relation to the drug phenomenon


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This section develops the definition of the public problem (Figure 2) in the field of illegal drugs, which in turn makes it possible to develop the overall strategy of a public policy.

We define the problem as an institutional arrangement that currently exposes citizens risks to avoidable risks. To support this argument, we first provide evidence of the effects on the public of an institutional arrangement with a specific characteristic, according to the methodology. This is followed by a description of the causes behind a state that fails to provide a more appropriate institutional framework. Here four causal sets are identified which indicate the pending issues on the agenda for designing a drug policy.

Figure 3.1 Problem tree



Source: Compiled by the authors

## An institutional arrangement that harms citizens

The current institutional arrangement the state maintains in the field of illegal drugs exposes its citizens to avoidable risks. As a result of the situation, effects are observed in at least three dimensions:

- a) Public health
- b) A delegitimized state
- c) Social and economic costs

Each one of these is reviewed below.

### a) Negative, critical effect on public health indices

The institutional arrangement provided by states in response to the drug phenomenon is shaped by a prohibitionist perspective. One effect associated with this view is that the state systematically fails to deal with risks that are completely avoidable. Some of these effects are inherent in the use of an illegal substance, as in any other substance that alters the normal parameters of reality. But unlike legal substances, which we allow as a society, its effects are not controlled by the state. There is no expectation that the state will deal with these

effects but rather a strong incentive for our government and security institutions to undertake actions that increase citizens' vulnerability.

Thus, inaction is part of the prohibitionist policy with negative effects and costs for society. For example, within the current framework of institutions, the supply of illegal drugs is stolen for profit only, while the state fails to provide mechanisms to reduce the risk of using illicit substances. The state is totally incapable of maintaining a market that offers sufficient information for users and establishes minimum rules for the production and distribution of these substances. The state systematically avoids issues related to production processes and quality control. This increases health risks for users since there is no information in the market on the dosage or potency of substances. It is currently not possible to determine the impact of illicit substance abuse on health, since many problems are associated more with low safety levels than with the use of the product as such.

Instead of addressing these issues, the state criminalizes actors in the illegal drug market. This puts consumers in an extremely vulnerable situation, as well as producers and all the other sectors of the market, which creates a chain of social costs that are difficult to quantify and usually hidden from the eyes of the state and society as a whole. For example, the state does not distinguish problem users who require specialized care from alleged criminals who should be taken to the state prosecutor's office. Nor does it distinguish between types of consumers and the kinds of treatments they require according to the type of substance they use. This has meant that overdose deaths are latent in the population using illegal drugs, which is an avoidable risk. In the United States, for example, in 2010 alone, 16,651 opioid overdose deaths and 3,036 deaths from heroin overdose were reported (WHO, 2014).

With a policy based exclusively on the prohibitionist approach, appropriate care for those with frequent or problematic drug use is restricted. Within this market, the use of therapies and practices that have proved effective in countries where there is a (Madrazo & Zwitter, undated) regulatory framework is either limited or restricted. The dissemination of safer practices (harm reduction) is also prevented. Both the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) indicate that there is a strong causal link between injectable drug use and the prevalence of infections such as HIV, HBV and HCV, as a result of high-risk practices among users of this type of substances. Practices such as those implemented in Canada and the Netherlands, to cite two examples, involving care and assistance centers with information on risk reduction in people who use drugs via their parents, are limited by the way the phenomenon of illicit drugs is currently defined.

## b) A state whose actions lack legitimacy

The state is facing a crossroads as regards illegal drugs. Decisions made in the international regime in relation to the phenomenon of illicit drugs have elicited

counterproductive results while proving extremely expensive for the state's performance. A recent report by the International Drug Policy Consortium suggests that the drug war has largely prevented the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (IDPC 2010). Accordingly, the new 2030 Agenda incorporates a new objective to promote peace, justice and inclusion while strengthening government institutions (UN resolution 70). Institutions currently designed to combat drug use have achieved precisely the opposite: more violence, less peace, less justice, more exclusion and the imminent delegitimization of the state. This means that there is an even more urgent need to heed the call Ban Ki-moon once made, "Our work to achieve the Millennium Development Goals and to combat drugs must go hand in hand" (June 22, 2010, Vienna).

The fight against drugs as we know it today has effects that weaken the state in at least two ways. Contrary to its stated objectives, it has triggered more violence and state agencies have succumbed to the complex networks of de facto powers. Prohibition has created black markets whose revenues are counted in thousands percent (Chambliss, 1992, Nexos, 2010; Caulkins, 2014; Atuesta, 2016). In Mexico, the market value of the drug trade, estimated by González-Ruiz (2001), is \$25 billion USD<sup>7</sup>, equivalent to 6 percent of the country's gross domestic product. Markets with this level of earnings provide advantages to criminal groups in strategic areas of the state that are infringed upon through coercion. Whereas in conventional markets, companies influence state policies legally through lobbying, generally regulated and monitored through accountability mechanisms, the campaigns of influence orchestrated by criminal organizations have no regulatory framework, there is no possibility of being called to account by non-criminal legal proceedings and therefore they constitute acts of corruption with a significant cost for governance. This type of action goes beyond the buying of consciences or the acquisition of parts of the state that are placed at the service of organized crime as happens with the police and the military (Dijk & Buscaglia, 2003, 11, Castill and Valencia, 2011 ; Morris, 2013; 198; Animal Político, 2014; Vertiz, 2015). It also involves coercion using psychological techniques such as fear or threats and physical techniques such as murder and kidnapping, among many others (Morris, 2013; 196).

Second, the state works with limited public resources and different policy areas technically competing for this funding. A resource earmarked for a specific sector or issue has opportunity costs that are sometimes difficult to calculate. The particular case of the prohibition strategy based on law enforcement means that the state has channeled funds into activities to combat organized groups in the drug production, transport and sale chain (Melis & Nougier, 2010). Spending in this sector varies widely according to the source consulted. On the one hand, it is estimated that spending during five years of Felipe Calderón's presidency was equivalent to 533% of the expenditure on science and technology in 2011 (Flores, 2011). Other data show that this figure could be approximately \$9 billion USD (Atuesta, 2016).

7 The quote mentions \$25 trillion USD. The discrepancy in numbers is due to the difference between the Anglosaxon and Latin system for counting these figures. "Un billón" means a million million, which is a trillion in English.

### c) High economic and social costs

The current prohibitionist policy associated with illicit drugs has created a range of problems with a considerable social and economic impact. In the Mexican case alone, there is a growing trend in the perception of insecurity among citizens, in the most immediate spheres such as their municipality and neighborhood, where rates of 65.1% and 45.4% respectively have been reported. Meanwhile, at the state level, this perception reaches 72.4% (INEGI, 2016). This is partly due to the confrontations with organized crime groups and a security strategy that favors the use of physical violence and the use of firearms to stop or contain illegal activities. A useful indicator in this respect is the figure of 32.4 civilians killed for every soldier, suggesting a high degree of lethality and excessive use of force (Perez-Correa et al., 2012). An increase in crime rates has been observed, which can partly be explained by criminal organizations' efforts at economic diversification as a financing strategy. According to estimates by Global Financial Integrity (2011), cited in Animal Político, (2016), it is estimated that the main activities are drug trafficking (\$320 billion USD), immigration document forgery (\$250 billion USD), human trafficking (\$31.6 billion USD), illegal oil trafficking (\$ 10.8 billion USD) and wildlife trafficking (\$10 billion USD). Moreover, due to both criminal acts and the prohibitionist policy itself which treats those carrying even small amounts of illicit drugs as criminals, the prison population has grown at an unsustainable rate. In the United States alone, the prison population has increased by 46% in the state system and 50% in the federal system as a result of changes in the law which impose penalties on drug carriers and users (Human Rights Watch, 2015). The damage done to the families of these people has far outstripped the alleged damage inherent in drug use or possession.

As a result of the growing market for illicit drugs and the attendant violence, a reduction in life expectancy of over 2.23 years has been observed in the case of Colombia (Soares, 2006) whereas in the case of Latin America, the loss is 0.6 years according to the same source<sup>8</sup>. This is largely due to the turf wars between criminal gangs and clashes with the police or military forces seeking to eliminate production and distribution channels. In this context, young people are one of the most vulnerable groups. Criminal groups implement recruitment programs that systematically target youths, who are then forced to take part in the drug business. For example, young people are actively involved in drug distribution at the micro level (schools, neighborhoods, bars, markets) as a result of which they leave school to devote themselves full time to these activities, thereby significantly exposing their lives. Moreover, surveys of Latin American countries show that age of first drug use among young people has fallen from 15 to 12 (CICAD, 2015).

The economic costs of the drug problem have several implications, some of which are direct, due to the effects of organized crime. Others are indirect, as part of the negative perception that exists of organized crime activities, which

<sup>8</sup> The author's calculation is based on the statistics compiled by the World Health Organization for the 1990s.

is reflected in preventive actions. For example, in 2010, 42.8% of large firms in the Mexican private sector earmarked approximately 2.2% of their profits for private security (IFC and WB, 2012). Small businesses, mainly those located in the northern states of Mexico, have been victims of extortion by having to pay dues, which has discouraged the setting up of new businesses (Correa-Cabrera, 2011). The INEGI victimization survey (2011) estimates that victims of crimes such as kidnapping or extortion, often related to organized crime, have suffered losses of nearly \$12.9 billion USD while companies' production value fell by about 3.6% due to theft and vandalism.

At the same time, the excessive violence stemming from the strategy of various forms of armed combat against organized crime causes economic and investment losses, higher spending on security as well as tangible material losses. However, other less tangible costs, yet with a great impact on development, include the loss of quality of life, the social anguish caused by a violent environment, the loss of confidence in institutions and the cost in human and social capital (Robles Calderón, Magaloni, 2013). Violence in this case is a byproduct identified as an inhibitor of development, economic growth (Bowman et al, 2008; Melis & Nougier, 2010, 4), and social cohesion (Schedler 2014) in that it jeopardizes government efforts to achieve greater development (Byrd & Ward, 2004; Guzman et al, 2014) and even the objectives of the Millennium Development Goals (Melis & Nougier, 2010).

Violence has escalated to levels similar to those of an internal armed conflict ("Organized crime and violence" Focus Group, CIDE Santa Fe, June 13, 2016). Currently, according to the Global Peace Index (2016), the estimated cost of violence is equivalent to 13.3% of world GDP. In Latin America and the Caribbean, the distribution of the total cost of violence in the region is concentrated mainly in violent crime, accounting for over 50%, with domestic security issues being responsible for 30%.

The use of public resources to support the militarized strategy to combat organized crime, and the hijacking of state institutions by criminal groups are the main factors responsible for the growing decline in citizens' confidence in state institutions (World Value Survey, 2014, Latinobarómetro, 2015). Distrust increases, among other things, as a result of the government's inability to respond to acts of torture, cases of enforced disappearances, rising crime and homicide rates (Open Society Justice, 2016).

Although the risks associated with the criminalized market of psychoactive substances behave differently in each world region (whether producers, transit regions or users), the intrinsic effects can be observed in the three dimensions identified here. The new institutional arrangement must therefore promote three goals to reduce these risks, namely: 1) Low levels of social and economic costs, 2) improved public health indices and 3) a state that maintains high levels of legitimacy.



04

## Part II. Reasons why a state fails to protect its citizens

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Drug Policy in the Americas:  
A redefinition of the problem and the state's role

In order to identify the reasons, a review was conducted of the literature and a large group of experts convened for an in-depth discussion<sup>9</sup> of the public problem linked to deregulated psychoactive substance markets. These analytical exercises made it possible to identify four reasons:

- 1) Psychotropic substance market operating outside a regulatory framework that ensures control by the state.
- 2) Inadequate, insufficient information on the drug phenomenon.
- 3) Enormous power of organized crime, which the state is unable to combat.
- 4) Government institutions that are inefficient and inflexible in response to the drug phenomenon.

### 1) Substance markets operating outside an appropriate regulatory framework.

The insistence on maintaining markets whose regimes focus exclusively on prohibition is one of the main factors that increase vulnerability, as explained in the previous section. The way a large segment of society has traditionally reacted to the issue of drug regulation, from the point of view of public policy, has paradoxically gone against public interest. “Deregulated” markets cause violence and create a complex system in which uncertainty and chaos prevail (Focus Group “Deregulated Markets Part 3” CIDE Santa Fe, July 11, 2016).

An example of this are the constant turf wars between organized crime groups and the abuse of authority to which drug users are subject as a result of being pre-classified as criminals. From the logic of a market with inelastic goods, in other words, when the amount demanded does not depend on the price offered, as often happens in the case of drugs, greater repression produces worse results than those that would be obtained if drugs were regulated, and taxes on them were raised (Becker, Murphy & Grossman, 2004). In other words, the economic logic surrounding black markets for drugs behaves in a way that is often difficult to predict for the purposes of public policy. This makes one wonder about the ability of the prohibitionist arrangement to enable the state to obtain additional revenue and maintain marginally more effective control over production, distribution and consumption. Without the above, society as a whole is more vulnerable.

At the international level, a series of institutional reforms have been implemented in relation to certain drugs such as marijuana. This is the case of several states in the US that have recently approved its recreational use. The trend towards legalizing marijuana observed in certain parts of the Americas is an important aspect to consider in the reformulation of the official discourse on drugs. In this respect, the existence of a regulatory framework should be assessed from the perspective of its ability to protect the human rights of users in particular and of society in general.

<sup>9</sup> The results of the focus groups and the participants' profiles are available in the Annex [Pending].

## 2) Inadequate and insufficient information on the drug phenomenon.

The quality and quantity of information available on the market and the effects of drugs is insufficient to make strategic decisions and design evidence-based policies. In other words, in order for governments to be able to implement public interventions to solve drug-related problems (addiction, overdose, insecurity, etc.), it is essential to have basic inputs that provide information and data.

Despite the efforts that scientific society and various organized groups have had on the production of information, scientific information on the effects of illicit drugs is currently limited or insufficient to generate the minimum knowledge required to be able to address the problem more objectively.

Given the dominant paradigm of prohibition and eradication, users without information are exposed to health risks due to the short-, medium- and long-term effects of drug use. A similar thing happens with prevention campaigns since, because this is a highly stigmatized issue in society, interventions fall short since they fail to provide a deep understanding of the subject. According to the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (2014), in recent years, a trend has been recorded in the emergence of new psychoactive substances (NPS). The NPS market has increased because of the high costs of illicit drugs coupled with users' need to find substances with similar effects at a lower price, exposing users and increasing health risks. However, little is known of their effects and composition. Without sufficient, adequate information, without the desire to have more objective knowledge, it is impossible to mitigate the risks society will experience by being exposed to a market that currently makes decisions on the basis of high doses of prejudice and stigma coupled with low amounts of evidence.

## 3) Great strength of organized crime, which the state is unable to combat

Organized crime, particularly drug trafficking in the Mexican case, is closely linked to violence. Violence performs various functions. For example, it can be considered as a means for economic purposes, but it can also be a channel for asserting power and even identity in relation to other groups (Williams, 2009). For the purposes of this document, Galtung's (1968) meaning of violence is adopted, which states that violence is exercised through any act that limits the physical and somatic potential of people, exercised by other people or organizations. This shows that the capacity for violence of groups of organized crime increases as a result of their operating structures and capital flows, which in turn provide strategic advantages over the state which competes for the hegemony of entire regions. In Mexico, for example, the market value of drug trafficking is equivalent to 6% of the country's GDP (Gonzalez-Ruiz, 2001) and estimated at approximately 1.5% of world GDP (UNODC, 2009). In light of the above and

with the aim of putting it in perspective, according to data from the World Drug Report (UNODC, 2016), global coca cultivation amounted to 132,000 ha with average annual growth of 10%, while the marijuana market (resin and grass) amounts to 7,267 tons with 6% average annual growth. The problem becomes even more complex if we consider that these groups have acquired transnational dimensions. Despite the lack of official data from international organizations, according to journalists and independent media sources, it is estimated that there are nine organized crime groups, with 37 allied criminal cells in the particular case of Mexico (Animal Político, 2016).

Accordingly, police and military forces have failed to dismantle organized crime groups, since this requires skills and tools they lack (UNODC, 2012). Organized crime is therefore both a cause<sup>10</sup> and an effect, and in the sense of public policies designed to reduce risks, it is essential to address the enormous power of organized crime as part of the causes that inflict damage on society and the state.

#### 4) Inefficient, inflexible government institutions

The annual allocation of public resources to military spending, mainly in developing countries means regulating other issues on the development agenda. In other words, states channel resources into addressing the fight against organized crime without providing revenue for themselves since this is not considered a public investment (Meza, undated). This is no small matter. Combating organized crime, regarded as a national security issue, encourages the discretionary spending of resources, in the guise of a “state secret”, and the results obtained may not be placed under public scrutiny. The lack of both accountability in terms of results, and transparency (availability of information), has led to widespread unrest in society, increasing the perception of corruption in state institutions. According to the Corruption Perception Index, countries with acute problems of organized crime such as Colombia, Mexico, Afghanistan, Turkey and Iran, to name a few, have low scores (Transparency International, 2015). Another indicator showing the ineffectiveness of government institutions is the unsentenced prison population. In Mexico, for example, 39% of prisoners under local jurisdiction have not been tried whereas in areas of federal jurisdiction, where most offenses linked to organized crime are located, this figure rises to 50.2% (México Evalúa, 2013). Likewise, in the rest of Latin America, law enforcement has similar features to Mexico. According to the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index (2015), only Costa Rica, Chile and Uruguay have scores of between 0.55 and 0.58<sup>11</sup> in the dimension of criminal justice that are similar to European countries such as Hungary and Romania, to mention just two examples.

<sup>10</sup> Understanding organized crime as a cause and effect involves going back in history in order to understand the trajectory of these groups at different times and the way their role has evolved over time.

<sup>11</sup> According to the methodology used, the closer the value is to 1, the more satisfactorily the factors comprising the dimension are qualitatively and quantitatively evaluated.



05


# Part III. Public Policy Agenda

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Drug Policy in the Americas:  
A redefinition of the problem and the state's role

The current drug policy exposes citizens to avoidable risks from drug phenomena. In order to design a set of actions and policies whereby the state is able to reduce these risks, it is necessary to advance the definition of the problem described earlier. The objectives tree (see Figure 3) is the phenomenon seen from the proactive perspective that guides the state's actions. In this case, the main objective is a state able to reduce the risks incurred by citizens as a result of the drug phenomenon.

Figura 5.1 Objectives tree



Source: Compiled by the authors

According to the definition of the problem, this type of state is achieved by actions taken to achieve four more specific objectives, namely 1) incorporating psychoactive substance markets into a regime that allows their effective control through regulation and standards; 2) increasing the production of evidence-based information on the phenomenon of drugs and their effects, designed for citizen; 3) weakening, controlling or neutralizing organized crime; 4) increasing the efficiency of government institutions. These four components are the means that must be implemented to achieve a state that reduces risks.

The following two tables describe the ends and means, as well as the components involved in the definition or work for each dimension. This exercise, which breaks down the components, has been instrumental in providing the most accurate definition of the indicators that could contribute to the system for monitoring countries' performance regarding the risks their citizens face as a result of the drug phenomenon and the institutional arrangements their states provide.

Table 2.-Ends

End 1: Improve public health indices	<b>Directly related:</b> effects with a direct impact on the health of illegal drug users, which would pose a health risk in the event of an upward trend.
	<b>Indirectly related:</b> conditions that pose a potential risk to individuals' health in the absence of state interventions for harm reduction.

End 2: Low levels of economic and social costs	<b>Acts of violence:</b> The type of acts that affect public safety and personal peace exerted in a violent way (physical, mental) way and/or lead to death.
	<b>Social costs:</b> collectively (1) They are those that affect the construction of the reality that exists in society regarding the drug phenomenon and (2) the impact of a drug policy that criminalizes citizens. At the individual level, it concerns the life expectancy related to the inherent risks of the drug phenomenon in the setting in which people develop.
	<b>Economic costs:</b> refers to (1) to the costs of the violence generated (in part) by the fight against organized crime and (2) the costs to the productivity and competitiveness of labor markets.
End 3: A state that maintains high levels of legitimacy	<b>Perception of legitimacy:</b> refers to the social support that exists in the actions exerted by the government within a democratic regime.
	<b>Acts that undermine trust:</b> acts that reflect the inability of the state to safeguard the security of society.

Source: Compiled by the authors

Table 1. Means

Means	Components
Goal 1: Incorporate psychoactive substance markets into a regime that permits their effective control through regulation and guidelines.	<b>Appropriate regulation:</b> the result of a public debate on the topic of psychoactive drugs and decision-making based on scientific evidence on the subject, it would promote the adjustment of countries' regulatory framework.
	<b>Institutions:</b> having appropriate regulation is expected to mean that economic, social and political aspects would be incorporated into the institutions of each country.
	<b>Fiscal use:</b> generally refers to tax collection. In particular, it is evidence of the revenue generated and its use. This is derived from the regulation of drugs previously classified as illegal.
Objective 2: Increase the production of evidence-based information for citizens on the drug phenomenon and its effects.	<b>Social Communication:</b> the way society is informed of the use and effects of drugs largely shapes public opinion and perception about them. Campaigns must therefore be based on objective scientific evidence.
	<b>Perception:</b> related to the impression society in general has about drug users regardless of whether this use is problematic, experimental or recreational. There is currently a negative stigma and the assumption underlying the component is that the more scientific evidence-based information there is, the less users will be stigmatized.
	<b>Judicial institutions:</b> proper regulation of psychoactive drugs would reduce the population imprisoned for possession of small amounts, which currently accounts for a significant portion of prison inmates.

Means	Components
Objective 3: Weaken, control or neutralize organized crime.	<p><b>Illegal flows of resources:</b> one of the expected effects of the proper regulation of psychoactive drugs is the weakening of organized crime, since this would considerably decrease the revenue generated by the sale of psychoactive drugs. Another expected effect, not directly related to proper regulation, is the increase in the number of weapons seizures and the dismantling of infrastructure as part of state intelligence operations.</p> <p><b>Organization:</b> the existence of a large number of organized crime groups poses a greater risk to peace. The impact of the proper regulation and consolidation of a system of institutions is expected to lead to the disappearance of some of these groups. Accordingly, the widespread perception of the de facto power of these groups would also decline.</p>
Objective 4: Increase the effectiveness of government institutions.	<p><b>Accountability:</b> one phenomenon associated with organized crime are the acts and networks of corruption linked to it. Although not all corruption in public life can be attributed to these groups, observing a decline in them would increase the credibility and effectiveness of government institutions.</p> <p><b>Government institutions:</b> the effectiveness of government institutions determines the quality of government administration. In relation to drug policy, effectiveness can be observed in the compilation of court records and the enforcement of justice.</p> <p><b>Use of resources:</b> a change in drug policy (laws, institutions) would assign a portion of the funds earmarked for security to other issues (e.g. health and education) to comprehensively address the drug phenomenon.</p>

Source: Compiled by the authors

## What is a monitoring platform?

Policy design, monitoring and evaluation must be evidence-based. This evidence-based policy trend promotes the use of information (or evidence) to intentionally guide the search for solutions to public problems defined under the model of causal relationships. In the recent literature on public policy, a key element for decision-making is information (Bracho, 2010, Arellano, 2012, Maldonado and Pérez, 2015). The information generated by government agencies, international organizations or academic institutions provides an overview of the capacities, scope and limitations of public action and therefore shows the results and effects that exist in the sphere of policy implementation.

In this respect, a monitoring platform, such as the one proposed here, is a systematic data bank that makes it possible to compare the goals pursued and the results obtained. In a broader sense, a monitoring platform promotes a deliberative arena that brings together government and society in a constructive discussion on the performance, results and impact of public action (Meza, 2016).

The key input for a monitoring platform are indicators and change theories. The role of indicators is to show over time how the variables and dimensions of the public problem constructed behave. In other words, indicators serve as

a conceptual network linking purposes, intentions and goals with actions and expected effects (Arellano; Lepore, Zamudio, Blanco and Guajardo, 2012) that contribute to the database. Conversely, theories of change collect arguments of causality and reveal the assumptions behind that casual chain. Indicators test the change theories originally put forward.

In the monitoring platform for this proposal, the purpose is to gather evidence on the behavior of the drug phenomenon at the continental level. The platform is intended to provide the capacity to compare countries on the American continent in a series of indicators that identify key dimensions to understand the effects of various drug policies on the risk to which citizens are subjected by the drug problem.

**Table 3. Platform of indicators to monitor drug policy**

Goals and objectives	Components	Ideal indicator (s) and proxy
End 1: Improve public health indices	Directly related:  Indirectly related:	(D) Ideal: Overdose death
		(D) Proxy: Overdose death
		(D) Ideal: Population with addiction
		(D) Proxy: Prevalence of youth – cannabis use
		(IN) Ideal: Population with infectious sexually transmitted diseases
		(IN) Proxy: Men who have sex with other men with syphilis
		(IN) Ideal: Population with HIV, HCV, HEV, Hepatitis
		(IN) Proxy: Population living with HIV
		(IN) Ideal: People with mental health problems
		(IN) Proxy: Number of suicides
End 2: A state that maintains high levels of legitimacy	Perception Acts that undermine trust	(P) Ideal: Confidence in government institutions
		(P) Proxy: Confidence in the government
		(P) Ideal: Support for the democratic regime
		(P) Proxy: Democracy is preferable to any other form of government
		(P) Ideal: Democratic participation
		(P) Proxy: I voted in the last presidential election
		(P) Ideal: Perception of corruption
		(A) Proxy: Transparency International rating
		(A) Ideal: Assassinations of politicians and/or authorities
		(A) Proxy: "To what extent are the following freedoms, rights, opportunities and securities guaranteed in (country)? Freedom to participate in politics"
		(A) Ideal: Murders of journalists
		(A) Proxy: World Press Freedom Ranking

End 3: Low economic and social costs	Acts of violence	(Ac) Ideal: Number of homicides
		(Ac) Proxy: Homicides per 100,000 inhabitants
		(Ac) Ideal: Violent crimes
		(Ac) Proxy: Violent crimes per 100,000 inhabitants
	Economic costs	(CE) Ideal: economic cost of violence
		(CE) Ideal: economic cost of violence
		(CS) Ideal: Life Expectancy
		(CS) Proxy: Life Expectancy
	Social costs	(CS): Perception of insecurity
		(CS) Proxy: Protection from crime
		(CS) Ideal: Prison population
		(CS) Proxy: Prison population per 100,000 inhabitants

Source: Compiled by the authors

**Table 3. Platform of indicators to monitor drug policy**

<b>Goal 1: Incorporate psychoactive substance markets into a regime that will permit their effective control through regulation and guidelines.</b>	Control by regulation	Under construction
	Government institutions	Under construction
	Fiscal use	Under construction
	Social Communication	Under construction
	Perception	Ideal: Negative stigmatization of drug users
		Proxy: "Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following statements? Legalization of marijuana use"
	Judicial institutions	Ideal: Population imprisoned due to possession of small amounts of drugs
		Proxy: People in prison for drug offenses
	Illegal flows of resources	Ideal: Illicit financial flows
		Proxy: Estimate of illicit financial flows
		Ideal: Arms seizures
		Proxy: Number of firearms seized by police
<b>Objective 3: Weaken, control or neutralize organized crime.</b>	Organization	Ideal: Perception of power of criminal organizations
		Proxy: What you consider to be the most important problem in the country?"

Objective 4: To increase the effectiveness of government institutions.	Accountability	Ideal: Incidence of acts of corruption
		Proxy: Proportion of companies that had at least one contact with a public official and who paid a bribe to a public official, or were asked for a bribe by those public officials during the previous 12 months
		Ideal: Corruption indicator
		Proxy: Control of corruption
	Government institutions	Ideal: Unsentedenced prison population
		Proxy: Overall proportion of unsentedenced prison population
	Use of resources	Ideal: Proportion of total budget allocated to Health
		Proxy: Public expenditure on health
		Ideal: Difference between budget amount assigned and spent
		Proxy: Would you say you are satisfied with the performance of...? The Judicial System

Source: Compiled by the authors

### Findings for America

This section presents some of the findings obtained through the indicator platform.<sup>12</sup> Obviously a great deal remains to be done regarding the available, public information. Since the regime has not exactly been liberal, it has not been so in terms of the information produced on the phenomenon either. Thus, of all the American countries (35), we have consistent, complete information in the 27 indicators for six countries: Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. We have called this group Tier 4.

Tier 3 consists of those countries which, in all the dimensions measured, report indicators with information but may be missing one or two, but not more than six indicators. This second group of countries comprises Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Dominican Republic, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela.

It was not possible to find compatible information for all the countries on the American continent. Some very important sources such as Latinobarómetro did not consider the United States or Canada. This made it impossible to obtain information that was compatible with the majority of countries in the Americas. Some alternatives have been identified that could be used to fill these gaps. In the meantime, it was decided to work with the countries in Tiers 4 and 3.


Figure 4 shows a simple correlation obtained by crossing the measurements

12 The indicator base for all the countries in the Americas is available as an annex.

obtained in the index of means and ends on the basis of the platform indicators. The procedure is very simple. A general index was drawn up to measure the level of ends achieved according to the logic of objective tree. The level of ends was calculated using the relative level countries obtain in the indicators shown in Table 3 as a reference. To determine the means index, the process was repeated using the indicators observed in Table 4. Details are available in the Annexes section. The correlation is apparently positive.

Figure 4 shows that the countries that scored best on the means index (x-axis) also scored highest on the ends index (y-axis). Uruguay is the country with the best level in the composite index of public health, state legitimacy and lowest socioeconomic costs related to the drug phenomenon. It is striking that Uruguay is followed by the Dominican Republic and Ecuador. However, this may also reflect other characteristics specific to the country that influence pre-existing levels in selected variables. Hence the importance of not over-interpreting this graph. It is just a snapshot that will have to be monitored over time to verify the inter-temporal changes in the correlation between means (horizontal axis - x) and ends (vertical axis -y)

**Figure 5.4 Correlation between Means and Ends**




Source: Compiled by the authors

On the means side, in other words, the state's alleged ability to reduce the risks incurred by their citizens, Chile reports the best levels. It is well above the next three, which include Costa Rica and Uruguay once again.

The simple correlation is encouraging, but cannot be interpreted as a sign of causality. Since each country has a different regime, as well as socioeconomic and political contexts, these points should be interpreted as a snapshot of the base level of each country in the process of monitoring them through the platform indicators.

Figure 5.5 Means and ends for four cases




Source: compiled by the authors

We took four cases to illustrate the levels obtained in each of the dimensions: Uruguay and El Salvador, since they are cases at either extreme in the means index and Mexico and Costa Rica because they are positioned in the middle, one with a better state capacity than the other. Figure 5 shows these countries with their levels for each of the dimensions comprising the means and ends indices.

Uruguay is the country that encompasses the widest area. This is consistent with the logic of the measurement, since the larger the area, the higher the score obtained in each of the dimensions comprising the means and ends. In terms of size of area, it is followed, in order of importance, by Costa Rica, Mexico and El Salvador.

Uruguay has higher levels than the others in the dimension of legitimized state. It is followed by Costa Rica and El Salvador, with Mexico being very close to the latter. The other dimensions are less clear. As for levels of socio-economic costs, all of them except El Salvador have very similar scores. In regards to public health indices, we see that Mexico has a slight advantage over Uruguay and Costa Rica, and that El Salvador is at the end of the line.

F Figure 5.6 Objectives Tree for Uruguay




Source: Compiled by the authors

On the side of the means, which theoretically affect the levels of the ends, we have Costa Rica and Uruguay jockeying for first place overall. As for information production, Uruguay is in the lead, followed by Costa Rica, Mexico and El Salvador. It should be noted that Costa Rica scores highest in combating organized crime followed by Uruguay, El Salvador and Mexico at the end. As for Government Effectiveness, Uruguay and Costa Rica are in the lead, followed once again by El Salvador and Mexico in last place.

This snapshot maintains other variables that explain the starting levels for each country. In other words, this is the baseline that future measurements will use as reference for each country. This is where we will test whether improving the means improves the ends.

In order to show the usefulness of the platform and the specific levels of each of the indicators for each country, figures 6, 7, 8 and 9 are included. They show the Objectives tree with the scores obtained for each country in each of the indicators for the corresponding dimensions-as well as the level of the dimension. The colors denote the relative position of the country within the set of countries. Thus green means that the score corresponds to the highest levels, yellow denotes a measure halfway down the table and red means a position at the bottom.


Figure 5.7 Objectives Tree for Costa Rica



Fuente: Compiled by the authors


Correspondingly, Uruguay and Costa Rica have greens and yellows whereas Mexico and El Salvador have more reds. The indicator associated with the codes that appear in the objective trees is at the bottom of Table 5.

Figure 5.8 Objectives Tree for Mexico



Fuente: Compiled by the authors

Figure 5.9 Objectives Tree for El Salvador



Fuente: Compiled by the authors

Table 5. Indicator Codes

Key	Indicator	Source	Year of information	Unit of Measurement
sp1	Overdose death	OAS	2009	Persons per 100,000 inhabitants
sp2	Use among youth	UNODC	2013	%
sp3	Men who have sex with other men and who have syphilis	WHO	2012	%
sp4	People living with HIV	UNAIDS	2015	Persons per 100,000 inhabitants
sp5	Number of suicides	WHO	2012	Persons per 100,000 inhabitants
ed1	Confidence in the government	Latinobarómetro	2015	A great deal and slightly (%)
ed2	Democracy is preferable to any other form of government	Latinobarómetro	2015	Strongly agree and agree (%)
ed3	I voted in the last presidential election	Latinobarómetro	2015	Yes (%)
ed4	Rating by Transparency International (index)	Transparency International	2016	Rating
ed5	"To what extent are the following freedoms, rights, opportunities and securities guaranteed in (country)? Freedom to participate in politics"	Latinobarómetro	2015	Completely and partly guaranteed (%)
ed6	World Press Freedom Ranking	Reporters without borders	2015	Rating

ces1	Homicides per 100,000 inhabitants	World Bank	2012	Persons per 100,000 inhabitants
ces2	Political stability and absence of violence	World Bank.	2014	Estimate calculated in a range of -2.5 to 2.5
ces3	Economic cost of activities that mitigate or combat violence	Institute for Economics & Peace	2015	% Of GDP
ces5	Life Expectancy	World Bank	2014	Years
ces6	Protection from crime	Latinobarómetro	2015	Not guaranteed at all and partly guaranteed (%)
ces7	Prison population per 100,000 inhabitants	International Centre for Prison Studies	2016	Persons per 100,000 inhabitants
id2	"Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following statements? Legalization of marijuana use "	Latinobarómetro	2015	Strongly Disagree and Disagree (%)
id3	People in prison for drug offenses	CEDD	2013	Percentage of population in prison for drug offenses
co1	Illegal money flows	Global Financial Integrity	2004-2013	Million dollars (nominal)
co2	Number of firearms seized by police	UNODC	2013	Persons per 100,000 inhabitants
co5	"What do you consider to be the most important problem in the country?"	Latinobarómetro	2015	Drug Trafficking and Crime (%)
gi1	Proportion of businesses which have had at least one contact with an official whom they have bribed or has requested a bribe in the past 12 months	UN	2010	%
gi2	Control of corruption	The Worldwide Governance Indicators	2014	Rating
gi3	Detained without trial as a proportion of the total prison population	UN	2014	Percentage of the prison population that is unsentenced
gi4	Public expenditure on health	CIDAD	2005	% of GDP
gi5	Would you say you are satisfied with the performance of...? The judicial system	Latinobarómetro	2015	Very satisfied and fairly satisfied (%)





06

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Drug Policy in the Americas:  
A redefinition of the problem and the state's role

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07

# Annexes

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Drug Policy in the Americas:  
A redefinition of the problem and the state's role

## Glossary of concepts

**Drug or alcohol addiction:** Repeated use of one or more psychoactive substances, to the extent that the user (referred to as an addict) is periodically or continuously intoxicated, shows a compulsion to use the preferred substance(s), has enormous difficulty in voluntarily interrupting or modifying the use of the substance and is determined to obtain psychoactive substances by any means.

**Use (drugs or alcohol):** Self-administration of a psychoactive substance.

**Controlled drug use:** use that is moderated to prevent intoxication or risky use. The term is used in particular when there is reason to doubt the ability to ingest substances in a controlled manner, as in the case of people who have shown signs of dependence. Regulation of substance use so that it does not affect everyday functioning and forms of use that minimize adverse effects.

**Drug abuse:** Pattern of use that exceeds a standard of moderate use or more ambiguously-social use. Usually defined as use that exceeds a certain daily volume (e.g. three drinks a day) or a specific amount per occasion.

**Experimental use:** in general, the first times a particular drug (sometimes including tobacco or alcohol) is used. The term may also refer to extremely infrequent or sporadic use.

**Harmful use:** Pattern of use of a psychoactive substance that damages health. Damage may be physical or mental (e.g. depressive episodes following massive ingestion of alcohol). Harmful use often, although not always, involves adverse social consequences. However, these consequences alone are not sufficient to justify a diagnosis of harmful use.

**Problematic use:** pattern of use that causes problems, whether individual or collective, involving health or society. When this expression began to be used, it meant that the intoxication and/or substance use was a response to a problem in a person's life. This term has been used since the mid 1960s in a more general sense to avoid referring to concepts of alcoholism or drug addiction as a disease.

**Drug control:** regulation, through a system of laws and institutions, of the production, distribution, sale and use of specific psychoactive substances (controlled substances) at the local, national or international level. This term is equivalent to illegal drugs policy.

**Organized crime:** criminal activity of a structured group of three or more persons, existing for some time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offenses established in accordance with the Palermo Convention<sup>13</sup> in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, illicit economic or political benefit or some other material benefit. Related activities include the

<sup>13</sup> The Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, known as the Palermo Convention, promotes multilateral cooperation to prevent and combat transnational organized crime. It is under the jurisprudence of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and became effective in Mexico on September 29, 2003.<0}

criminal market, encompassing all kinds of forbidden trafficking from gambling and prostitution through various forms of sexual trade, counterfeiting and kidnapping to terrorism. When an illegal organization deals in arms or illegal psychoactive substance trafficking, the analogous term is “cartel”.

**Decriminalization:** repeal of laws or rules classifying a behavior, product or phase as criminal. The term is used in connection with illegal drugs and the crime of drunkenness in the public thoroughfare in some countries. It is sometimes used to refer to a reduction in the severity of a crime or the penalties involved, for example, when there is a reduction in the penalty for possession of marijuana, which goes from being a crime punishable by detention and imprisonment, to an offense punishable by a warning or fine. Thus, a distinction is usually made between decriminalization and legalization, which consists of the complete repeal of any definition of a particular behavior as a crime, often accompanied by an effort by the government to control or influence the market for the product or the behavior affected.

**Drug:** Term with various uses. In medicine, it refers to any substance with the potential to prevent or cure a disease or enhance physical or mental health whereas in pharmacology, it refers to any chemical substance that modifies the physiological and biochemical processes of tissues or organisms. A drug is therefore a substance that is or may be included in the Pharmacopoeia. In colloquial speech, the term usually refers specifically to psychoactive substances and often, even more specifically, to illegal drugs. Scientific theories (e.g. “Alcohol and other drugs”) usually attempt to prove that caffeine, tobacco, alcohol and other substances often used for non-medical purposes are also drugs in the sense that they are taken, at least partly, for their psychoactive effects.

**Designer drug:** new chemical substance with psychoactive properties, specifically synthesized for its illegal sale, which infringes laws on controlled substances. In response, these laws often now include new substances and possible analogues of existing psychoactive substances. The term was coined in the 1980s.

**Illegal drug:** Psychoactive substance whose production, sale or consumption are prohibited. Strictly speaking, the drug itself is not illegal; what is illegal is its production, sale or consumption in certain circumstances in a particular jurisdiction. The more accurate term “illegal drug market” refers to the production, distribution and sale of any drug or medication outside legally permitted channels.

**Legal drug:** Psychoactive substance that legally available by prescription or sometimes even without one in a given jurisdiction.

**Legalization:** set of measures taken to make a behavior, product or a situation that formerly constituted a crime legal.

**Drug trafficking:** the trading of toxic substances, which includes the manufacture, distribution, sales, market control, consumption and recycling of

narcotics, whether addictive or not, that are potentially harmful to health.

**Opiates** belonging to the group of alkaloids derived from the opium poppy (from the Latin *Papaver somniferum*), which has the ability to induce analgesia, euphoria and, in high doses, stupor, coma and respiratory depression. The term opiate excludes synthetic opioids.

**Opioid:** generic term applied to the alkaloids of the opium poppy (*Papaver somniferum*), its synthetic analogs and compounds synthesized in the body that interact with the same specific brain receptors, have the ability to relieve pain and produce a sense of being (euphoria). Opioid alkaloids and their synthetic analogues also cause stupor, coma and respiratory depression when used in high doses. Opium alkaloids and their semisynthetic derivatives include morphine, diacetylmorphine (diamorphine, heroin), hydromorphine, codeine and oxycodone. Synthetic opioids include levorphanol, propoxyphene, fentanyl, methadone, pethidine (meperidine) and pentazocine, an agonist-antagonist. Endogenous compounds with opioid actions are endorphins and enkephalins.

**Drug policy:** (1) In the context of psychoactive substances, the set of policies designed to influence supply and demand for illegal drugs at the local or national level, which includes education, treatment, control and other programs and policies. In this respect, the policy does not include pharmaceutical policy (except as regards the diversion to non-medical use) or alcohol and tobacco policy. (2) In the context of the WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs, “national drug policy” refers to the pharmaceutical policy of a country on the marketing, availability and therapeutic use of drugs. The WHO recommends that all countries have a policy of this kind, designed within the context of a national health policy. The WHO List of Essential Medicines is an effort to help developing countries design a pharmaceutical policy in line with the allocation of scarce funds for pharmaceutical products based on health needs rather than market aspects.

**Drug-related problem:** any adverse consequence of drug use, especially illegal ones. “Related” does not necessarily imply causation. The term was coined by analogy with “alcohol-related problem,” but is used less, because it is the drug itself, rather than its consequences, which tends to be considered a problem. It may be used to refer to problems at an individual or social level. International drug control takes drug-related problems into account to establish a level of control for a controlled substance through the assessment by WHO of the potential for dependence and the predisposition to drug abuse. A possible related term is “drug problems,” although this can be confused with “the drug problem,” which refers to illegal drugs understood as a political issue.

**Damage reduction:** in the context of alcohol and other drugs, this expression describes policies or programs that focus directly on reducing the damage caused by alcohol or drug use. It is used particularly to refer to policies or programs that attempt to reduce harm without necessarily affecting the underlying drug use. Examples include exchanging needles and syringes to counter the

sharing of needles among heroin addicts or installing airbags in cars to reduce traffic accident injuries, particularly those caused by driving under the effects of alcohol.

**Overdose:** use of any drug or medicine in an amount that causes acute adverse physical or mental effects. Intentional overdose is a common form of suicide or attempted suicide. In absolute figures, there are more overdoses of legal than illegal drugs. Overdoses can cause temporary or prolonged effects and even death; the lethal dose of a particular substance varies depends on the person and circumstances.

**Psychoactive drug or substance:** substance which, when ingested, affects mental processes, e.g. cognition or affectivity. This term and its equivalent, psychotropic substance, are the most neutral and descriptive expressions for referring to the whole group of legal and illegal substances, of interest to drug policy. Although “Psychoactive” does not necessarily imply that it produces dependence in everyday language, this feature is implicit in the terms “drug use” or “substance abuse”.

**Controlled Substances:** psychoactive substances and their precursors whose distribution is prohibited by law or restricted to medical and pharmaceutical uses. Substances that are currently subject to this control vary by country. The term is often used to refer to psychoactive substances and their precursors, mentioned in international conventions on drugs (Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, amended by the 1972 Protocol, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, the 1988 Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances). Nationally and internationally, controlled substances are usually classified into categories that reflect the varying degrees of restriction on their availability.

**Recreational use:** use of a drug, usually illegal, in social or relaxing situations, which implies that there is no dependence or other problems. Authors who define any type of illegal drug use as problematic disapprove of this term.

**Violence:** the presence of factors (direct and structural) that undermine people’s potential psychological and somatic development.

**Direct violence:** its main characteristic is the fact that most of its effects are visible, most of which are material but not all: the hatred generated, the psychological traumas created or the emergence of concepts such as “the enemy” are equally serious effects that are not usually regarded as such.

**Structural Violence:** structural factors are situations that damage the satisfaction of basic human needs (survival, welfare, identity or freedom) as a result of social stratification processes.

## Focus Groups

"Public Health Indicators" Focus Group (pilot group) CIDE Santa Fe, April 5, 2016

----- "Public health indicators" CIDE Santa Fe, April 15, 2016

----- "Delegitimized State" Part 1 CIDE Santa Fe, June 20, 2016

----- "Delegitimized State" Part 2 CIDE Santa Fe, June 20, 2016

----- "Delegitimized State" Part 3 CIDE Santa Fe, June 21, 2016

----- "Organized crime and violence" CIDE Santa Fe, June 13, 2016

----- "Deregulated markets" Part 1 CIDE Santa Fe, July 11, 2016

----- "Deregulated markets" Part 2 CIDE Santa Fe, July 11, 2016

----- "Deregulated markets" Part 3 CIDE Santa Fe, July 22, 2016

----- "Social costs" Part 1 CIDE Santa Fe, July 13, 2016.

----- "Social costs" Part 2 CIDE Santa Fe, July 13, 2016.

## Guide for conducting focus groups

### Identification of public issues in the health sector sphere that must be addressed by any drug policy

*Set up the video recorders and turn them on when you are ready; the goal is to record for as long as possible.*

*Estimated duration range: 60-90 minutes (Note: Tell participants that the session will last between 60 and 120 minutes so that those who wish to leave early can leave after 60 minutes and those who wish to stay longer can leave after 90).*

#### 1. Introduction (2:50)<sup>14</sup>

- Welcome and thanks: introduction of moderator and assistant (s)
- General presentation of the topic/issue to be addressed:
  - "Our topic is ...; the results will be used to ...; you were selected because ... "
- Explanation of the dynamics and rules of the session:
  - "There are no right or wrong answers, just different points of view;
  - The session will be recorded, so we ask you to express their views and/or experiences one at a time;
  - You don't have to agree, but you must listen to other people's opinions respectfully;

<sup>14</sup> See the example of introducing the session and establishing rapport.

- We ask you to please turn off all mobile devices and if this is not possible, then answer outside the discussion area as quietly as possible and then quickly re-join the group.
- I'm the moderator, so I will guide you during the discussion, so I ask you to please talk among yourselves about the topics I'll give you".

## 2. Establishing rapport

- First issue/question: Names and activities and interests of participants  
*(Explore their work or academic experience or main activity in the field of drug policy)*

## 3. Perspectives on the relationship between the current psychotropic drug market and health risks (intrinsic and indirect) of drug use

### 3.1. Associated health problems and their sources

- *What do you think about the health risks to which legal and illegal psychotropic drug users are exposed?*
- Σ *What do you think are the greatest health risks for psychotropic drug users?*
  - *What do you think are the main factors leading to overdose and intoxication in users?*

### 3.2. Health and infectious diseases

- *What do you think about the relationship between infectious diseases and psychotropic drugs?*
- Σ *What do you think about injectable drugs and practices involved in blood-borne and/or sexually transmitted diseases?*

### 3.3. Alcohol and illegal drugs

- *What do you think the link is between alcohol and illegal drugs?*
- Σ *What do you think about the effects of alcohol on health compared with those of illegal drugs?*

## 4. Quality of illegal drugs

### 4.1 Quality of illegal psychotropic drugs

- *What is your perspective on the quality of illegally produced drugs?*
- Σ *What are the factors that encourage the production of poor quality, adulterated or extremely strong substances?*

### 4.2 Quality control

- *What factors do you think are required in order for there to*

*be quality control in the production of illegal drugs?*

## 5. Aspects of prohibitionism

- *What do you think are the main characteristics of prohibitionist drug policies?*

### 5.1 Prohibition and barriers to quality health care

- *How do you perceive the relationship between prohibitionist drug policies and the quality of health care services for illegal drug users in countries where they hold this view?*
  - Σ *There is a possibility that out of fear, illegal drug users prefer alternative substances whose effects are unknown to doctors. What impact do you think this has on the quality of health care for users?*
  - Σ *There are now therapies with prohibited drugs -essential and non essential- and treatments for drug abusers that are very effective, but cannot be used in countries where they have prohibitionist policies. What is your opinion on this?*
  - Σ *What do you think are the main consequences when there is a lack of access to proper, objective information -based on scientific information- to prevent the effects of drug use?*
    - *What are the differences and similarities found in the information produced to prevent drug problems in prohibitionist and non-prohibitionist countries?*

### 5.2 Prohibition and its health side effects on users and suppliers as well as the health of others and the general public

- *What effects on the health and welfare of users and providers do you think there would be if the prohibitionist perspective was replaced by a non prohibitionist one?*
  - Σ *How do you think these changes would occur and to what extent?*
  - Σ *How do these changes affect the human rights of users and suppliers?*
    - *How do you think these changes would affect situations such as physical violence, imprisonment, torture and corporal punishment and death involving users and suppliers?*
  - Σ *What links can you identify between the economic incentives generated by psychotropic drug markets and physical violence towards drug suppliers and consumers?*

- *What side effects on the health of third parties-and the general public- do you believe are related to prohibition and psychotropic drug markets?*
- Σ *What effect do you think that the violence linked to illegal drug markets has on the families of drug users and suppliers?*
- Σ *How do methods to eradicate production sources such as herbicide spraying affect people in the vicinity?*
- *If such a link exists, how do you perceive the relationship between prohibitionist policies, the current drug market and the implementation of public budgets?*
- *What are the outstanding features of the political, economic and social contexts of countries with prohibitionist drug policies?*
- *What characteristics can you identify in non-prohibitionist legal frameworks?*

#### **6. Public health problems that should be addressed by drug policies**

- *If you had to specifically define which public problems in the field of health any drug policy should address both in Mexico and in other countries, which would they be?*
- *Of all the topics previously shared, which do you regard as the most important?*

#### **7. Conclusion (appropriate use of findings)**

- *Review objective of focus groups (public problems in the health sector associated and/or derived from the use of drugs and markets that produce them)*
- *Do you think we have missed out anything important?*

#### **8. Words of thanks and farewell**

##### **Example of rapport**

##### **1) Suggested introduction to begin focus group sessions**

- *"Good morning/afternoon and welcome. Thank you for agreeing to give us your time to join this session on drug policy and the health sector. My name is " \_\_\_\_\_ " and I will be assisted by " \_\_\_\_\_ ". We are both affiliated to the CIDE and are part of the research team responsible for its Drug Policy Program. The session is designed to gather information on the public problems in the field of the health sector associated with drug use and the markets that produce them. As part of this program, it is essential to know your point of views and experiences in this area of public policy, what you agree or disagree on and your proposals for the definitions of these public problems.*

- You were selected to participate in this session because we know you have extensive experience and have participated in activities in the field of drug policy related to the health sector.
- It is important to point out that in these exercises there are no right or wrong answers, just different points of view. Please feel free to share your views even if they substantially differ from what others have said. Bear in mind that these differences and/or similarities are one of the most important aspects of this method and we are interested in any type of feedback; sometimes negative comments are even more helpful than others.
- You will probably have noticed the recording devices. We want you to know that we are recording this session so as not to miss any of your valuable comments. People discuss various vital issues in these sessions but we cannot write fast enough to record all the information. Although we will address you by your names, they will not be used in any of our reports. Rest assured that the data will be safeguarded with full confidentiality.
- Let's begin then. We have name tags to help us to remember each other's names. Let us get to know each other a little better. Could you tell us your name, and a little about your work or academic experience in this field?

## Focus Group Participants

ID 1	Affiliation	Organization/ Agency	Profile	Table	Atlas.ti
PPFP01	Director of coordination in national addiction programs	Health Secretariat	Civil servant	Pilot test	XB
PPFP02	Directorate General of Coordination, Bonding, Prevention and International Cooperation	National Commission against Addictions (CONADIC)	Civil servant	Pilot test	XC
PPSC01		Collective for an Integral Drug Policy (CUPIHD)	Civil Society	Pilot test	XE
PPFP03	Former Director General	Institute for the Prevention and Treatment of Addictions (IAPA)	Civil servant	Pilot test	XH
PPSC02	Risk and Damage Prevention	Collective for an Integral Drug Policy (CUPIHD)	Civil Society	Pilot test	XD
PPSC03		Collective for an Integral Drug Policy (CUPIHD)	Civil Society	Pilot test	XI
				Pilot test	XG
SPSC01	Coordinator of the Latin American Program for Drug Policy Reform	Mexico United Against Crime	Civil Society	Public health	B
SPFP01	Former Director General	Institute for the Prevention and Treatment of Addictions (IAPA)	Civil servant	Public health	A
SPFP02	Congressman	Mexican Congress	Civil servant	Public health	C
SPFP03	Deputy Director of Research	Institute for the Prevention and Treatment of Addictions (IAPA)	Civil servant	Public health	D
SPFP04	Congresswoman	Mexican Congress	Civil servant	Public health	E
SPFP05	Local delegate	Jalisco Congress	Civil servant	Public Health	G
SPSC02	Risk and Damage Prevention	Collective for an Integral Drug Policy (CUPIHD)	Civil Society	Public Health	H
SPSC03	Consultant	Independent	Civil Society	Public health	I
SPFP06		National Institute of Public Health	Civil servant	Public health	K
				Public health	F
				Public health	J
CSFP01	Congresswoman	Mexican Congress	Civil servant	Social costs 1	R
CSSC01	Journalist		Civil Society	Social costs 1	I
CSFP02	Senator	Senate	Civil servant	Social costs 1	A
CSSC02		Collective for an Integral Drug Policy (CUPIHD)	Civil Society	Social costs 1	C
CSSC03		Collective for an Integral Drug Policy (CUPIHD)	Civil Society	Social costs 1	AC
CSAI01	Conacyt Chair	Center for Economic Research and Teaching (CIDE)	Academic	Social costs 1	F
CSAI01	Institutional Coordinator	Drug Policy Program	Academic	Social costs 2	B
CSSC01	Director:	Citizen Security and Peace	Civil Society	Social costs 2	C

ID 1	Affiliation	Organization/ Agency	Profile	Table	Atlas.ti
CSSC02		Collective for an Integral Drug Policy (CUPIHD)	Civil Society	Social costs 2	D
CSFP01	Director of operational coordination	General Secretariat of Government - Est. Mexico	Civil servant	Social costs 2	E
CSAI02	Research fellow	Center for Advanced Research and Studies in Social Anthropology (CIESAS)	Academic	Social costs 2	F
CSAI03	Conacyt Chair	Center for Economic Research and Teaching (CIDE)	Academic	Social costs 2	G
				Deregulated Markets 1	R
				Deregulated Markets 1	C
				Deregulated Markets 1	Car
MDSC01	Director	National Criminal Stoplight	Civil Society	Deregulated Markets 1	S
MDSC02	Consultant	Foundation for due process	Civil Society	Deregulated Markets 1	J
MDIP01	Lawyer	Sánchez Curiel, Conesa and Garcia Office	Private enterprise	Deregulated Markets 1	L
				Deregulated Markets 1	P
MDFP01	Senator	Senate	Civil servant	Deregulated Markets 1	M
MDSC03	Secretariat	Global Commission on Drug Policy	Civil Society	Deregulated Markets 1	SAR
MDSC01	Director	National Criminal Stoplight	Civil Society	Deregulated Markets 2	S
MDAC01	Research fellow	Center for Economic Research and Teaching (CIDE)	Academic	Deregulated Markets 2	L
MDSC02		Collective for an Integral Drug Policy (CUPIHD)	Civil Society	Deregulated Markets 2	A
MDSC02	Research fellow	Center for Economic Research and Teaching (CIDE)	Academic	Deregulated Markets 2	M
MDSC03	Representative-Mexico	Friedrich Ebert Foundation	Civil Society	Deregulated Markets 2	H
MDFP01	Director-General	National Institute of Public Health	Civil servant	Deregulated Markets 3	M
				Deregulated Markets 3	Gris
MDFP02	Head of Department of Research on Tobacco	National Institute of Public Health	Civil servant	Deregulated Markets 3	LM
MDOI01	Secretariat	Global Commission on Drug Policy	International Organization	Deregulated Markets 3	S
MDAC01	Research fellow	Center for Economic Research and Teaching (CIDE)	Academic	Deregulated Markets 3	L
MDFP03	Head of Department of Research on Tobacco	National Institute of Public Health	Civil servant	Deregulated Markets 3	T

ID 1	Affiliation	Organization/ Agency	Profile	Table	Atlas.ti
MDSC01		Collective for an Integral Drug Policy (CUPIHD)	Civil Society	Deregulated Markets 3	Ch
EDIP01	Consultant	Lantia Consultores	Private enterprise	Delegitimized state 1	E
EDFP01	General and political	Former governor of Morelos	Civil servant	Delegitimized state 1	J
EDAC01	Research fellow	Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Occidente	Academic	Delegitimized state 1	G
EDOI01	Regional Advisor on Democratic Governance and Citizen Security	United Nations Development Program Latin America and the Caribbean	International Organizations	Delegitimized state 1	JS
EDSC01	Consultant	Foundation for due process	Civil Society	Delegitimized state 2	XM
EDAC01	Research fellow	Center for Economic Research and Teaching (CIDE)	Academic	Delegitimized state 2	CPC
EDIP01	Consultant	Lantia Consultores	Private enterprise	Delegitimized state 2	EDG
EDAC02	Research fellow	Center for Economic Research and Teaching (CIDE)	Academic	Delegitimized state 2	JSI
EDOI01	Regional Advisor on Democratic Governance and Citizen Security	United Nations Development Program Latin America and the Caribbean	International Organizations	Delegitimized state 2	JS
EDSC02	Co-founder	Mexico United Against Crime	Civil Society	Delegitimized state 2	JAO
EDSC03	Treasurer	Mexico United Against Crime	Civil Society	Delegitimized state 2	PG
EDFP01	General and political	Former governor of Morelos	Civil servant	Delegitimized state 2	JCO
EDAC01	Research fellow	Center for Economic Research and Teaching (CIDE)	Academic	Delegitimized state 3	Y
				Delegitimized state 3	W
EDSC01		México Evalúa	Civil Society	Delegitimized state 3	M
EDOP01		National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI)	Public organization	Delegitimized state 3	O
EDOP02		National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI)	Public organization	Delegitimized state 3	A
EDOI01	Regional Advisor on Democratic Governance and Citizen Security	United Nations Development Program Latin America and the Caribbean	International Organization	Delegitimized state 3	S
COAC01	Research fellow	Center for Advanced Research and Studies in Social Anthropology (CIESAS)	Academic	Organized crime	CAF
COAC02	Research fellow	Center for Economic Research and Teaching (CIDE)	Academic	Organized crime	Moderator 2
COAC03	Conacyt Chair	Center for Economic Research and Teaching (CIDE)	Academic	Organized crime	Checked shirt

ID 1	Affiliation	Organization/ Agency	Profile	Table	Atlas.ti
CSSC01	Journalist		Civil Society	Organized crime	Green shirt
CSAI02	Research fellow	Center for Economic Research and Teaching (CIDE)	Academic	Social costs 1	L
CSAI04	Research fellow	Center for Economic Research and Teaching (CIDE)	Academic	Social costs 2	A
MDSC03	Research fellow	Center for Economic Research and Teaching (CIDE)	Academic	Deregulated Markets 2	JJ
				Delegitimized state 3	C
PPAC01	Research fellow	Center for Economic Research and Teaching (CIDE)	Academic	Pilot test	XA
PPFP04	Congressman	Chamber of Deputies.	Civil servant	Pilot test	XF
MDSC01	Research fellow	Center for Economic Research and Teaching (CIDE)	Academic	Deregulated Markets 1	JJ
				Delegitimized state 3	W
				Delegitimized state 3	R
PPAC01	Research fellow	Center for Economic Research and Teaching (CIDE)	Academic	Public health	AML
				Delegitimized state 3	F
MDSC02	Research fellow	Center for Economic Research and Teaching (CIDE)	Academic	Deregulated Markets 3	JJ
EDAC02	Research fellow	Center for Economic Research and Teaching (CIDE)	Academic	Delegitimized state 3	X

Metadata on Indicators Sheet

## Public health

<b>Code</b>	Sp1		
Proposed indicator name	Overdose death		
Indicator name found	Overdose death		
Component it addresses	Public Health - Directly related		
Periodicity	Annual		
Source	Organization of American States: OEA - <a href="http://www.oas.org/dsp/espanol/cpo_observatorio.asp">http://www.oas.org/dsp/espanol/cpo_observatorio.asp</a>		
Nature of value	Standardized per 100,000 inhabitants		
Values:	Min: .37	Max.: 30.78	Mean: 3.54
Interpretation of value	The higher the indicator of overdose deaths, the less the public health goal is achieved.		

<b>Code</b>	Sp1
<b>Relevance of indicator</b>	<p>Focus group(s): The indicator is important because it involves the cost in human lives, where current prohibitionist interventions have exposed users to risk because they lack the necessary information, leading to irresponsible use. It is also relevant because there are examples of public policy that have reduced overdose deaths by using safe injection places and offering quality products.</p> <p>Source: Atlas.ti Pilot, public health p1 &amp; p2, p1 &amp; p2 social costs, deregulated markets p. 3 and delegitimized state p.3</p> <p>Literature: Today's psychotropic drug markets increase the risk that consumers will experience an overdose in the short term, and other adverse health effects and/or become addicted in the medium and long term. (...) prohibitionism complicates proper care of overdose, addiction and preventable diseases".</p> <p>Source: "Indicadores de Salud Pública" – Madrazo &amp; Zwitter</p>
<b>Indicator Coverage</b>	<p>North America:</p> <p>United States and Mexico</p> <p>Central America &amp; Caribbean:</p> <p>Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts &amp; Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Lucia, Trinidad &amp; Tobago</p> <p>South America:</p> <p>Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela</p>

<b>Code</b>	Sp2
<b>Proposed indicator name</b>	Population with addiction
<b>Indicator name found</b>	Prevalence, Youth - Cannabis-Type (Prevalence of youth – cannabis use)
<b>Component it addresses</b>	Public Health - Directly related
<b>Periodicity</b>	
<b>Source</b>	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime: ONUDD (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime: UNODC) - <a href="https://data.unodc.org/">https://data.unodc.org/</a>
<b>Unit of Measurement</b>	Percentage
<b>Values:</b>	Min: .5      Max.: 38.96      Mean: 15.93
<b>Interpretation of value</b>	<p>The higher the indicator of prevalence of cannabis use, the lower the achievement of the goal of improving public health indicators.</p> <p>Focus group(s): The indicator is relevant because of the lack of information available to people with addictions. On the one hand, it is argued that consumers are addicted because of the socio-psychological problems in their immediate context and, on the other hand, that the type of drug creates addiction.</p> <p>Source: Atlas.ti Public health p1 &amp; p2, social costs p1 &amp; p2, deregulated markets p2 and organized crime and violence</p>
<b>Relevance of indicator</b>	<p>Literature: Prohibitionism complicates proper care of overdose, addiction and avoidable diseases (...) prohibitionism complicates the treatment of drug addictions, and may indirectly also affect the drug addict's relatives"</p> <p>Source: "Indicadores de Salud Pública" – Madrazo &amp; Zwitter</p>

<b>Indicator Coverage</b>	<p>North America: Canada, United States and Mexico</p> <p>Central America &amp; Caribbean: Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Dominican Republic, St. Kitts &amp; Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Lucia, Trinidad &amp; Tobago</p> <p>South America: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela</p>
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<b>Code</b>	Sp3
<b>Proposed indicator name</b>	Population with infectious sexually transmitted diseases
<b>Indicator name found</b>	Men who have sex with men (MSM) with active syphilis (Men who have sex with men with syphilis)
<b>Component it addresses</b>	Public Health - Indirectly related
<b>Periodicity</b>	
<b>Source</b>	World Health Organization: WHO (World Health Organization: WHO) - <a href="http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.main.A1361STI?lang=en">http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.main.A1361STI?lang=en</a>
<b>Unit of Measurement</b>	Percentage
<b>Values:</b>	Min: 1.2      Max.: 30.4      Mean: 12.52
<b>Interpretation of value</b>	The higher the percentage of people with sexually transmitted infectious diseases, the lower the achievement of the goal to improve public health indicators.
<b>Relevance of indicator</b>	<p>Literature: "Another consequence of greater persecution of the drug supply means that (...) some (problem) drug users can no longer finance their use in a legal way, so they look for other ways to get money. One of these is prostitution: a practice correlated with the transmission of sexually transmitted infections and HIV and HBV. Consequently, current psychotropic drug markets increase the prevalence of HIV, HBV and sexually transmitted infections in the general population.</p> <p>Source: "Indicadores de Salud Pública" – Madrazo &amp; Zwitter</p>
<b>Indicator Coverage</b>	<p>North America: Mexico Central America &amp; Caribbean: Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Antigua &amp; Barbuda, Bahamas, Jamaica and Trinidad &amp; Tobago</p> <p>South America: Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana and Peru</p>

<b>Code</b>	Sp4
<b>Proposed indicator name</b>	Population with HIV, HCV, HEV, Hepatitis
<b>Indicator name found</b>	People Living with HIV (Population living with HIV)
<b>Component it addresses</b>	Public Health - Indirectly related
<b>Periodicity</b>	
<b>Source</b>	The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS: UNAIDS (The Joint United Nations Programmer on HIV and AIDS: UNAIDS) <a href="http://aidsinfo.unaids.org/">http://aidsinfo.unaids.org/</a>

<b>Unit of Measurement</b>	Standardized per 100,000 inhabitants		
<b>Values:</b>	Min: .0004	Max : .0062	Mean: .0031737
<b>Interpretation of value</b>	The higher the indicator of people living with HIV, the lower the achievement of the goal of improving public health indicators.		
<b>Relevance of indicator</b>	<p>Literature: "The current psychotropic drug markets that increase the prevalence of HIV, HBV and sexually transmitted infections in the general population are: 1) persecution of injection paraphernalia, which encourages needle sharing and 2) the imprisonment of drug providers and users exposes them to an environment in which there are high levels of high-risk practices toward drug use and sexual relationships."</p> <p>Source: "Indicadores de Salud Pública" – Madrazo &amp; Zwitter</p>		
<b>Indicator Coverage</b>	<p>North America:</p> <p>Mexico</p> <p>Central America &amp; Caribbean:</p> <p>Belize, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Bahamas, Cuba, Haiti, Jamaica and Trinidad &amp; Tobago</p> <p>South America:</p> <p>Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela</p>		

<b>Code</b>	Sp5		
<b>Proposed indicator name</b>	People with mental health problems		
<b>Indicator name found</b>	Intentional self-harm, both Sexes (intentional self-harm, both sexes)		
<b>Component it addresses</b>	Public Health - Indirectly related		
<b>Periodicity</b>	Annual		
<b>Source</b>	<p>World Health Organization: WHO</p> <p>(World Health Organization: WHO)</p> <p><a href="http://apps.who.int/healthinfo/statistics/mortality/whodpms/">http://apps.who.int/healthinfo/statistics/mortality/whodpms/</a></p>		
<b>Unit of Measurement</b>	Number of deaths		
<b>Values:</b>	Min: 2	Max : 42773	Mean: 13364
<b>Interpretation of value</b>	The higher the number of suicides, the lower the achievement of the goal of improving public health indicators		
<b>Relevance of indicator</b>	<p>Literature: "The violence generated by drug markets due to the prohibition and repression of markets by the state causes deaths, injuries and damages to mental health, which constitute a serious public health problem (...) The drop in average life expectancy, the increase in homicide as a cause of death in certain ethereal groups and the effects on the mental health of large sectors of the population as a result of violence, force one to consider violence itself, not just addiction, as one of the main health problems -if not the main one- a drug policy should contemplate and seek to minimize".</p> <p>Source: "Indicadores de Salud Pública" – Madrazo &amp; Zwitter</p>		
<b>Indicator Coverage</b>	<p>North America:</p> <p>Canada, United States and Mexico</p> <p>Central America &amp; Caribbean:</p> <p>Belize, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Haiti and Jamaica.</p> <p>South America:</p> <p>Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guayana, Peru, Surinam, Uruguay and Venezuela</p>		

## Delegitimized state

<b>Code</b>	Ed1		
<b>Proposed indicator name</b>	Confidence in government institutions		
<b>Indicator name found</b>	Confidence in the government		
<b>Component it addresses</b>	Legitimized state - Perception of legitimacy		
<b>Periodicity</b>	Annual		
<b>Source</b>	Latinobarómetro - <a href="http://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp">http://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp</a>		
<b>Unit of Measurement</b>	Percentage (Combines "a lot" and "a bit")		
<b>Values:</b>	Min: 18.8	Max.: 59.7	Mean: 32.39
<b>Interpretation of value</b>	<p>The more positive the perception of confidence in the government, the greater the achievement of the goal of a legitimized state.</p> <p>Literature: "The loss of confidence in government institutions reduced the legitimacy of these mechanisms in the eyes of society, which, in turn, reduces the incentives for governments to maintain the level of the budget or interest assigned to the issue of citizen contact and participation".</p> <p>Side effects of black markets where drug transactions take place have imposed a high, often hidden, cost on society. One of these costs is associated with the state's ability to govern. (...) The experience of drug-related violence affecting this type of municipal institutions, which has implications for the governance of public policies.</p> <p>Source: "La retractación del Estado" - Oliver Meza, workbooks. Monitor 17.</p>		
<b>Relevance of indicator</b>	<p>North America:</p> <p>Mexico Central America &amp; Caribbean:</p> <p>Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama.</p> <p>South America:</p> <p>Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela</p>		
<b>Indicator Coverage</b>			

<b>Code</b>	Ed2		
<b>Proposed indicator name</b>	Support for the democratic regime		
<b>Indicator name found</b>	Democracy is preferable to any other form of government		
<b>Component it addresses</b>	Legitimized state - Perception of legitimacy		
<b>Periodicity</b>	Annual		
<b>Source</b>	Latinobarómetro - <a href="http://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp">http://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp</a>		
<b>Unit of Measurement</b>	Percentage ("strongly agree" and "agree" are added)		
<b>Values:</b>	Min: 33.1	Max.: 83.5	Mean: 56.36
<b>Interpretation of value</b>	<p>The higher the percentage of support for the democratic regime, the higher the achievement of the goal of the legitimated state.</p> <p>Support for the democratic regime provided by citizens provides better levels of legitimacy for the state itself. The link between this indicator and the legitimated state is functional under the assumption that the country lives in a democratic regime. Otherwise, it only guarantees the citizen's preference for a regime s/he does not enjoy.</p>		
<b>Relevance of indicator</b>			

<b>Indicator Coverage</b>	North America:
	Mexico Central America & Caribbean: Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama
	South America: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela

<b>Code</b>	Ed3		
<b>Proposed indicator name</b>	Democratic participation		
<b>Indicator name found</b>	I voted in the last presidential election		
<b>Component it addresses</b>	Legitimized state - Perception of legitimacy		
<b>Periodicity</b>	Annual		
<b>Source</b>	Latinobarómetro - <a href="http://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp">http://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp</a>		
<b>Unit of Measurement</b>	Percentage		
<b>Values:</b>	Min: 33.1	Max.: 83.5	Mean: 56.36
<b>Interpretation of value</b>	The higher the percentage of participation in the elections, the greater the achievement of the goal of a legitimated state		
<b>Relevance of indicator</b>	<p>Literature: "Municipalities decrease the number of institutions that allow them to promote participation and consultation with citizens (...) The reduction of mechanisms prepared to citizen contact and participation is a retraction that decreases the state's capacity".</p> <p>Source: "La retractación del Estado" - Oliver Meza, workbooks. Monitor 17.</p>		
<b>Indicator Coverage</b>	<p>North America:</p> <p>Mexico Central America &amp; Caribbean:</p> <p>Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama.</p> <p>South America:</p> <p>Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela</p>		

<b>Code</b>	Ed4		
<b>Proposed indicator name</b>	Perception of corruption		
<b>Indicator name found</b>	Rating		
<b>Component it addresses</b>	Legitimized state - Perception of legitimacy		
<b>Periodicity</b>	Annual		
<b>Source</b>	Transparency International <a href="http://www.tm.org.mx/transparencia-internacional/">http://www.tm.org.mx/transparencia-internacional/</a>		
<b>Unit of Measurement</b>	Rating		
<b>Nature of value</b>	Natural		
<b>Values:</b>	Min: 17	Max.: 82	Mean: 44.09
<b>Interpretation of value</b>	The higher the rating of perceived corruption, the lower the achievement of the goal of a legitimized state		

<b>Relevance of indicator</b>	<p>Literature: "(...) these are corrupt acts that have significant costs for state capacity. This type of action goes beyond the buying of consciences or the acquisition of parts of the state that are placed at the service of organized crime, as with the police or military forces (Dijk and Buscaglia, 2003: 11; Castill and Valencia, 2011; Morris, 2013: 198; Animal Político, 2014; Vertiz, 2015). It also involves psychological coercion techniques of fear or threats, and physical techniques such as murder and kidnapping, among many others (Morris, 2013: 196)".</p> <p>Source: "La retractación del Estado" - Oliver Meza, workbooks. Monitor 17.</p>
<b>Indicator Coverage</b>	<p>North America: Canada, United States and Mexico</p> <p>Central America &amp; Caribbean: Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama and Trinidad &amp; Tobago.</p> <p>South America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guayana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela</p>

<b>Code</b>	Ed5
<b>Proposed indicator name</b>	Assassinations of politicians and/or authorities
<b>Indicator name found</b>	"To what extent are the following freedoms, rights, opportunities and securities guaranteed in (country)? Freedom to participate in politics"
<b>Component it addresses</b>	Legitimated state - Measures that undermine confidence
<b>Periodicity</b>	Annual
<b>Source</b>	Latinobarómetro - <a href="http://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp">http://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp</a>
<b>Unit of Measurement</b>	Percentage ("completely" and "partly guaranteed" are combined)
<b>Values:</b>	Min: 41.1      Max.: 86.6      Mean: 61.61
<b>Interpretation of value</b>	<p>The higher the number, the worse the freedom of expression, the lower the number, the better the freedom of expression</p> <p>Literature: "Murders, resulting from interventions by public security forces, have a more immediate impact on the proliferation of violence through the fragmentation of criminal groups" (...) There is, "An upward trend in violence measured by the murder rate produced by clashes "between criminals and authorities". Likewise, the presence of criminal groups in government institutions has created an environment of hostility and extortion for public officials.</p>
<b>Relevance of indicator</b>	<p>Source: Cómo las intervenciones de las fuerzas públicas – Laura Atuesta &amp; Aldo Ponce, workbooks. Monitor 19.</p> <p>Focus group: S: There is a record of threats to judicial officials or public functionaries</p> <p>Source: Atlas.ti The delegitimized state Part 3</p>
<b>Indicator Coverage</b>	<p>North America: Mexico Central America &amp; Caribbean: Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama.</p> <p>South America: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela</p>

<b>Code</b>	Ed6		
<b>Proposed indicator name</b>	Murders of journalists		
<b>Indicator name found</b>	World Press Freedom Ranking		
<b>Component it addresses</b>	Legitimized state - Measures that undermine confidence		
<b>Periodicity</b>	Annual		
<b>Source</b>	Reporters without Borders for Freedom of Information <a href="https://rsf.org/es">https://rsf.org/es</a>		
<b>Unit of Measurement</b>	Rating		
<b>Values:</b>	Min: 11.1	Max.: 70.23	Mean: 29.65
<b>Interpretation of value</b>	The higher the number of murders of journalists, the lower the achievement of the goal of a legitimized state		
<b>Relevance of indicator</b>	<p>Literature: "In 2015, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) reported that in the previous year, Mexico was ranked as the seventh deadliest country in which to exercise this profession. The main CPJ indicator was the number of murders of journalists linked to the exercise of their profession"</p> <p>Source: Voces silenciadas - Edgar Guerra, workbooks</p>		
<b>Indicator Coverage</b>	<p>North America: Canada, United States and Mexico</p> <p>Central America &amp; Caribbean: Belize, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama and Trinidad &amp; Tobago.</p> <p>South America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guayana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela.</p>		

### Economic and social costs

<b>Code</b>	ces1		
<b>Proposed indicator name</b>	Homicides per 100,000 inhabitants		
<b>Indicator name found</b>	Homicides per 100,000 inhabitants		
<b>Component it addresses</b>	Economic and social costs - Acts of violence		
<b>Periodicity</b>	Annual		
<b>Source</b>	World Bank - <a href="http://www.bancomundial.org/">http://www.bancomundial.org/</a>		
<b>Nature of value</b>	Standardized per 100,000 inhabitants		
<b>Values:</b>	Min: 1.56	Max.: 91.03	Mean: 20.10
<b>Interpretation of value</b>	The higher the number of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, the lower the achievement of the goal to reduce economic and social costs		

<b>Relevance of indicator</b>	<p>Literature: "It is argued that the huge number of homicides causes an overload of work for the justice system (...) although the use of terms such as "narco-violence" or "drug violence" is common, it becomes difficult to identify and tabulate the homicides specifically linked to the drug industry (...)</p> <p>Other analysts warn that there could be political interests in manipulating statistics to create the impression that the number of murders is dropping. The same doubts about the reliability and consistency of homicide data point to the need for data that will enable the monitoring and evaluation of the security situation".</p> <p>There has been an increase in homicides "in countries like Mexico, where drug trafficking has existed for decades but without the levels of violence currently observed" (...) Homicides and other crimes (such as abductions, disappearances and extortion) have occurred in strategic places, especially in municipalities along trafficking routes and borders".</p> <p>Source: Organized crime and violence - Sonja Wolf</p>		
	<p><b>Indicator Coverage</b></p> <p>North America: Canada, United States and Mexico</p> <p>Central America &amp; Caribbean: Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts &amp; Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Lucia, Trinidad &amp; Tobago.</p> <p>South America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guayana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela.</p>		

<b>Code</b>	Ces2		
<b>Proposed indicator name</b>	Violent crimes per 100,000 inhabitants		
<b>Indicator name found</b>	Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism		
<b>Component it addresses</b>	Economic and social costs - Acts of violence		
<b>Periodicity</b>	Annual		
<b>Source</b>	World Bank - <a href="http://www.bancomundial.org/">http://www.bancomundial.org/</a>		
<b>Unit of Measurement</b>	Natural		
<b>Values:</b>	Min: 12.38	Max.: 96.67	Mean: 35.26
<b>Interpretation of value</b>	<p>The greater the political stability and lack of violence/terrorism, the greater the achievement of the goal to reduce economic and social costs</p> <p>Literature: "Violence is linked to organized crime, regardless of whether criminals are involved in the drug industry, other traffic, or more localized crimes such as extortion and kidnapping. (...) The difficulty is to distinguish violence stemming from drug trafficking or organized crime from violence for other reasons (...) The way violence is characterized and the motivations for it has implications for public policy".</p> <p>Source: Crimen organizado y violencia – Sonja Wolf</p>		
<b>Relevance of indicator</b>			

<b>Indicator Coverage</b>	<p>North America: Canada, United States and Mexico</p> <p>Central America &amp; Caribbean: Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts &amp; Nevis, St. Vincent &amp; the Grenadines, St. Lucia, Trinidad &amp; Tobago.</p> <p>South America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guayana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela.</p>
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<b>Code</b>	Ces3
<b>Proposed indicator name</b>	Estimated cost of violence
<b>Indicator name found</b>	The economic cost of violence containment
<b>Component it addresses</b>	Economic and social costs - economic costs
<b>Periodicity</b>	Annual
<b>Source</b>	Institute for Economics & Peace: IEP Institute for Economics and Peace: Global Peace Index) <a href="http://economicsandpeace.org/">http://economicsandpeace.org/</a>
<b>Unit of Measurement</b>	Value relative to GDP
<b>Values:</b>	Min: 3      Max.: 21      Mean: 8.58
<b>Interpretation of value</b>	The higher the cost of violence, the lower the achievement of the goal of reducing economic and social costs
<b>Relevance of indicator</b>	<p>Literature: "Although it is said that most of the violence is caused by criminals fighting for their share of the illicit market, government efforts have also created violence (...). Violence is associated with an increase in unemployment: for every 10 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, unemployment rises by 0.5%. (...) Robles et al. (2013) found a negative effect of drug-related violence in participation in the workforce, local businesses and unemployment rates. However, he found no effect on economic growth".</p> <p>Source: Economic costs of the drug phenomenon - Laura Atuesta</p>
<b>Indicator Coverage</b>	<p>North America: Canada, United States and Mexico</p> <p>Central America &amp; Caribbean: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Cuba, Haiti, Jamaica and Trinidad &amp; Tobago.</p> <p>South America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guayana, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.</p>

<b>Code</b>	Ces5
<b>Proposed indicator name</b>	Life Expectancy
<b>Indicator name found</b>	Life Expectancy
<b>Component it addresses</b>	Economic and social costs - social costs
<b>Periodicity</b>	Annual
<b>Source</b>	World Bank - <a href="http://www.bancomundial.org/">http://www.bancomundial.org/</a>
<b>Unit of Measurement</b>	Years

<b>Values:</b>	Min: 62.74	Max.: 81.95	Mean: 74.32
<b>Interpretation of value</b>	The higher the life expectancy, the higher the achievement of the goal to reduce economic and social costs		
<b>Relevance of indicator</b>	<p>Literature: "The material costs of crime and violence have been estimated at between 3.5 and 5% of GDP in Latin America and the Caribbean. Evidence suggests that a year's loss of life expectancy due to violence is associated with a social cost of 3.8% of GDP (excluding the damage to the health of nonfatal victims)"</p> <p>Source: Economic costs of the drug phenomenon - Laura Atuesta</p>		
<b>Indicator Coverage</b>	<p>North America: Canada, United States and Mexico</p> <p>Central America &amp; Caribbean: Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts &amp; Nevis, St. Vincent &amp; the Grenadines, St. Lucia, Trinidad &amp; Tobago.</p> <p>South America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guayana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela.</p>		

Code	Ces6		
Proposed indicator name	Perception of insecurity		
Indicator name found	"To what extent are the following freedoms, rights, opportunities and securities guaranteed in (country)? Protection from crime"		
Component it addresses	Economic and social costs - social costs		
Periodicity	Annual		
Source	Latinobarómetro - <a href="http://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp">http://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp</a>		
Unit of Measurement	Percentage ("not guaranteed at all" and "not guaranteed" are added)		
Values:	Min: 37.3	Max .: 79.2	Mean: 57.91
Interpretation of value	The lower the level of the indicator, the lower the achievement of the goal of protecting from crime.		
	Literature: "Current government policies produce high economic and political costs involving loss of life and the widespread feeling of rampant insecurity."		
Relevance of indicator	Source: Cómo las intervenciones de las fuerzas públicas – Laura Atuesta & Aldo Ponce, workbooks. Monitor 19.		
	North America: Mexico Central America & Caribbean Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama. South America: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela		
Indicator Coverage			

<b>Code</b>	Ces7
<b>Proposed indicator name</b>	Prison population
<b>Indicator name found</b>	Prison population per 100 thousand inhabitants
<b>Component it addresses</b>	Economic and social costs - Social costs

<b>Periodicity</b>	Annual		
<b>Source</b>	International Centre for Prison Studies ICPS (International Center for Prison Studies) <a href="http://www.prisonstudies.org/">http://www.prisonstudies.org/</a>		
<b>Unit of Measurement</b>	Standardized per 100,000 inhabitants		
<b>Values:</b>	Min: 102	Max .: 693	Mean: 290.45
<b>Interpretation of value</b>	The larger the prison population, the lower the achievement of the goal of reducing economic and social costs.		
<b>Relevance of indicator</b>	Literature: "Among the federal prison population sentenced in 2012, 27% reported having been placed under a restriction order while only 14.6% -just over half-reported having been convicted of organized crime (Pérez Correa and Azaola, 2012: 69)2		
	"The incarceration of consumers is often literally a barrier to proper medical care for any health problem resulting from drug use". Source: El impacto de la política de drogas – Alejandro Madrazo, workbooks. Monitor 07		
	"Indicadores de Salud Pública" – Madrazo & Zwitter		
<b>Indicator Coverage</b>	North America:		
	Canada, United States and Mexico		
	Central America & Caribbean:		
	Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, St. Lucia, Trinidad & Tobago.		
	South America:		
	Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guayana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela.		

### Information on the phenomenon of drugs and their effects

<b>Code</b>	Id2		
<b>Proposed indicator name</b>	Negative stigmatization of drug users		
<b>Indicator name found</b>	"Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following statements? "Legalization of marijuana use "		
<b>Component it addresses</b>	Information on the drug phenomenon-Perception		
<b>Periodicity</b>	Annual		
<b>Source</b>	Latinobarómetro - <a href="http://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp">http://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp</a>		
<b>Unit of Measurement</b>	Percentage ("Strongly disagree" and "disagree" are added)		
<b>Values:</b>	Min: 39.9	Max .: 94.6	Mean: 81.33
<b>Interpretation of value</b>	The higher the level of the indicator, the higher the level of stigmatization of use.		
<b>Relevance of indicator</b>	Literature: "Prohibition and criminalization of consumers cause stigma towards drug users. This stigma may be perceived or real (e.g. drug testing in the workplace) (...).		
	Source: "Indicadores de Salud Pública" – Madrazo & Zwitter		

<b>Indicator Coverage</b>	<p>North America:</p> <p>Mexico Central America &amp; Caribbean</p> <p>Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama</p> <p>South America:</p> <p>Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela</p>
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<b>Code</b>	Id3
<b>Proposed indicator name</b>	Prison population due to possession of small amounts of drugs
<b>Indicator name found</b>	People in prison for drug offenses
<b>Component it addresses</b>	Information on the drug phenomenon - Judicial Institutions
<b>Periodicity</b>	Annual
<b>Source</b>	Colectivo de Estudios de Drogas y Derecho: CEDD <a href="http://www.drogasyderecho.org/index.php/es/">http://www.drogasyderecho.org/index.php/es/</a>
<b>Unit of Measurement</b>	Percentage of population in prison for drug offenses
<b>Values:</b>	Min: 1.27      Max.: 138.2      Mean: 25.26
<b>Interpretation of value</b>	The greater the population in prison for drug offenses, the less information is produced on the drug phenomenon
<b>Relevance of indicator</b>	<p>Literature: "The federal government is currently criminalizing youth marijuana users for merely possessing the substance without having committed any other offense. (...) They continue criminalizing use and users, especially courts that regard the mere consumption and possession of drugs as criminal behavior".</p> <p>Source: La expansión de los tribunales de drogas – Tania Ramírez, workbooks. Monitor 21.</p>
<b>Indicator Coverage</b>	<p>North America:</p> <p>Mexico</p> <p>Central America &amp; Caribbean:</p> <p>Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama.</p> <p>South America:</p> <p>Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay</p>

### Weakening organized crime

<b>Code</b>	Co1
<b>Proposed indicator name</b>	Illicit financial flows
<b>Indicator name found</b>	Illicit financial flows
<b>Component it addresses</b>	Weakening organized crime - illegal flows of resources
<b>Periodicity</b>	Annual
<b>Source</b>	Global Financial Integrity: GFI - <a href="http://www.gfintegrity.org/">http://www.gfintegrity.org/</a>
<b>Unit of Measurement</b>	In millions of nominal U.S. dollars )
<b>Values:</b>	Min: 2      Max.: 52844      Mean: 4652.375
<b>Interpretation of value</b>	The greater the amount of money produced by the illegal market, the lower the achievement of the goal of weakening organized crime

<b>Relevance of indicator</b>	<p>Literature: "Conflict and violence are not only derived from competition as such, but also from oligopolistic and monopolistic conditions, especially when these conditions limit the organically competitive nature of illicit markets"</p> <p>Source: Crimen organizado y violencia – Sonja Wolf</p>
	<p>Literature: Although organized crime has been described as a catalyst for financial flows that have favored economically depressed localities, the net balance is negative (Dijk 2007: 51) and illicit activity, far from modifying the structure of working conditions in the primary sector, takes advantage of them, exacerbates them and increases the risks incurred by these workers (Melis and Nougier, 2010: 5)</p> <p>Source: "La retractación del Estado" - Oliver Meza, workbooks. Monitor 17.</p>
<b>Indicator Coverage</b>	<p>North America:</p> <p>Mexico</p> <p>Central America &amp; Caribbean:</p> <p>Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts &amp; Nevis, St. Vincent &amp; the Grenadines, St. Lucia, Trinidad &amp; Tobago.</p> <p>South America:</p> <p>Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guayana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela.</p>

<b>Code</b>	Co2		
<b>Proposed indicator name</b>	Arms seizures		
<b>Indicator name found</b>	Number of firearms reported seized by police		
<b>Component it addresses</b>	Weakening organized crime - illicit flows of resources		
<b>Periodicity</b>	Annual		
<b>Source</b>	<p>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime: ONUDD (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime: UNODC)</p> <p><a href="https://www.unodc.org/">https://www.unodc.org/</a></p>		
<b>Unit of Measurement</b>	Standardized per 100,000 inhabitants		
<b>Values:</b>	Min: .008	Max :.158	Mean: .0715
<b>Interpretation of value</b>	<p>The greater the number of firearms seized by the police, the more the aim of weakening organized crime is achieved</p>		
<b>Relevance of indicator</b>	<p>Literature: "Killings associated with organized crime can be identified by the modus operandi: they show features of executions, include the use of firearms. However, although organized crime groups often use firearms in homicides, not all homicides committed with firearms are perpetrated by organized crime groups".</p> <p>Tentative: Crimen organizado y violencia – Sonja Wolf</p>		
<b>Indicator Coverage</b>	<p>North America:</p> <p>Mexico</p> <p>Central America &amp; Caribbean:</p> <p>El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, Dominican Republic and Trinidad &amp; Tobago.</p> <p>South America:</p> <p>Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.</p>		

<b>Code</b>	Co5		
<b>Proposed indicator name</b>	Perception of power of criminal organizations		
<b>Indicator name found</b>	"What do you consider to be the country's main problem?"		
<b>Component it addresses</b>	Weakening organized crime - Organization		
<b>Periodicity</b>	Annual		
<b>Source</b>	Latinobarómetro - <a href="http://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp">http://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp</a>		
<b>Unit of Measurement</b>	Percentage (Sum of "Drug trafficking" and "Crime")		
<b>Values:</b>	Min: 3	Max.: 42.4	Mean: 23.43
<b>Interpretation of value</b>	The greater the perception of the power of criminal organizations, the lower the achievement of the goal of weakening organized crime.		
<b>Relevance of indicator</b>	<p>Literature: "All drug market transactions are conducted outside the civil justice system, violence being the main mechanism for conflict resolution. This promotes organized crime groups, which further increases violence. At the same time, prohibition increases corruption by forcing participants to undertake illegal activities by bribing state officials".</p> <p>Source: Costos económicos del fenómeno de las drogas- Laura Atuesta</p>		
<b>Indicator Coverage</b>	<p>North America: Mexico Central America &amp; Caribbean Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and Dominican Republic</p> <p>South America: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela</p>		

### Increasing the effectiveness of government institutions

<b>Code</b>	Gi1		
<b>Proposed indicator name</b>	Incidence of acts of corruption		
<b>Indicator name found</b>	Proportion of businesses that had at least one contact with a public official and that paid a bribe to a public official, or were asked for a bribe by those public officials during the previous 12 months		
<b>Component it addresses</b>	Effectiveness of Government Institutions - Accountability		
<b>Periodicity</b>	Annual		
<b>Source</b>	United Nations Organization: UN (The United Nations: UN) - <a href="http://www.un.org/">http://www.un.org/</a>		
<b>Unit of Measurement</b>	Percentage		
<b>Values:</b>	Min: 1.2	Max.: 31.5	Mean: 9.78
<b>Interpretation of value</b>	The greater the proportion of companies that paid a bribe to a public official, the lower the achievement of the goal of increasing the efficiency of government institutions.		
<b>Relevance of indicator</b>	<p>Literature: "It seems that in Mexico businesses pay dues and extortion fees to organized crime (...) As the market generates exorbitant revenue to finance criminal activities, and the costs of bribery are low, intensifying sanctions and police practices will generate perverse consequences and promote organized crime causing violence, corruption and high crime rates".</p> <p>Source: Economic costs of the drug phenomenon - Laura Atuesta</p>		

<b>Indicator Coverage</b>	<p>North America:</p> <p>Mexico</p> <p>Central America &amp; Caribbean:</p> <p>Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, St. Kitts &amp; Nevis, St. Vincent &amp; the Grenadines, St. Lucia, Trinidad &amp; Tobago.</p> <p>South America:</p> <p>Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Paraguay, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela.</p>
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<b>Code</b>	Gi2
<b>Proposed indicator name</b>	Transparency indicator
<b>Indicator name found</b>	Corruption control
<b>Component it addresses</b>	Effectiveness of Government Institutions - Accountability
<b>Periodicity</b>	Annual
<b>Source</b>	Worldwide Governance Indicators: WGI <a href="http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home">http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home</a>
<b>Unit of Measurement</b>	Rating
<b>Values:</b>	Min: 4.81      Max.: 93.75      Mean: 48.88
<b>Interpretation of value</b>	The more corruption is controlled, the higher the achievement of the goal of increasing the effectiveness of government institutions
<b>Relevance of indicator</b>	<p>Literature: Studies on drug policy in Mexico have been developed in a context of misinformation and a lack of information structures necessary for management, monitoring, transparency, accountability and overall decision making (Centro de Estudios de las Finanzas Públicas CEF 2006; 2010; Reyes Tépac, 2006a; 2006b; 2008; 2009a; 2009b, 2009c; 2010a; 2010b; 2011; Sosa-Rubi, Sesma and Guijarro, 2000).</p> <p>Source: El impacto presupuestario de una política de drogas prohibicionista- Gabriel Puro-Cid, workbooks. Monitor 03.</p>
<b>Indicator Coverage</b>	<p>North America:</p> <p>Canada, United States and Mexico</p> <p>Central America &amp; Caribbean:</p> <p>Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts &amp; Nevis, St. Vincent &amp; the Grenadines, St. Lucia, Trinidad &amp; Tobago.</p> <p>South America:</p> <p>Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela.</p>

<b>Code</b>	Gi3
<b>Proposed indicator name</b>	Unsentenced prison population
<b>Indicator name found</b>	Unsentenced detainees as a proportion of overall prison population
<b>Component it addresses</b>	Effectiveness of government institutions.
<b>Periodicity</b>	Annual
<b>Source</b>	United Nations Organization: UN (The United Nations: UN) - <a href="http://www.un.org/">http://www.un.org/</a>
<b>Unit of Measurement</b>	Percentage of the prison population that is unsentenced

<b>Values:</b>	Min: 12.29	Max.: 83.66	Mean: 43.70
<b>Interpretation of value</b>	The larger the unsentenced prison population, the lower the achievement of the goal of increasing the effectiveness of government institutions		
<b>Relevance of indicator</b>	<p>To determine the effectiveness and performance of the courts in the procedures for issuing sentences. To observe the effectiveness or otherwise of the courts.</p> <p>Literature: "The inmates had not been sentenced, which prevents them from forming part of any reintegration programs inside prisons". (García, 2012: p. 170).</p> <p>Source: La expansión de los tribunales de drogas – Tania Ramírez</p> <p>"It is argued that the huge number of homicides causes an overload of work for the justice system"</p> <p>Source: Crimen organizado y violencia – Sonja Wolf</p>		
<b>Indicator Coverage</b>	<p>North America:</p> <p>Canada, United States and Mexico</p> <p>Central America &amp; Caribbean:</p> <p>Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Antigua &amp; Barbuda, Bahamas, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts &amp; Nevis, St. Vincent &amp; the Grenadines, St. Lucia, Trinidad &amp; Tobago.</p> <p>South America:</p> <p>Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Paraguay, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela.</p>		

<b>Code</b>	Gi4		
<b>Proposed indicator name</b>	Proportion of the total budget allocated to Health		
<b>Indicator name found</b>	Public expenditure on health		
<b>Component it addresses</b>	Effectiveness of Government Institutions – Use of resources		
<b>Periodicity</b>	Annual		
<b>Source</b>	Centro de Investigaciones para el desarrollo: CIDAD - <a href="http://cidac.org/">http://cidac.org/</a>		
<b>Unit of Measurement</b>	Percentage of GDP		
<b>Values:</b>	Min: .3	Max.: 7.5	Mean: 3.21
<b>Interpretation of value</b>	The greater the public health expenditure, the higher the achievement of the goal of increasing the effectiveness of government institutions		
<b>Relevance of indicator</b>	<p>Literature: "Every peso spent on the fight against drugs cannot be spent on public health (...) The violence resulting from current drug markets undermines the social development of countries experiencing violence related to the war on drugs and thus reduces the budget these countries could spend on public health. Consequently, prohibitionism and the current psychotropic drug markets reduce the budget available for public health".</p> <p>Source: "Indicadores de Salud Pública" – Madrazo &amp; Zwitter</p>		
<b>Indicator Coverage</b>	<p>North America:</p> <p>Canada, United States and Mexico</p> <p>Central America &amp; Caribbean:</p> <p>Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts &amp; Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Lucia, Trinidad &amp; Tobago.</p> <p>South America:</p> <p>Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela.</p>		

<b>Code</b>	Gi5		
<b>Proposed indicator name</b>	Difference between budget assigned and budget spent		
<b>Indicator name found</b>	Would you say you are satisfied with the performance of...? The judicial system		
<b>Component it addresses</b>	Effectiveness of Government Institutions – Use of resources		
<b>Periodicity</b>	Annual		
<b>Source</b>	Latinobarómetro - <a href="http://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp">http://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp</a>		
<b>Unit of Measurement</b>	Percentage - "Very satisfied" and "quite satisfied" are added		
<b>Values:</b>	Min: 18.4	Max.: 52.8	Mean: 32.27
<b>Interpretation of value</b>	The greater the satisfaction with the way the judicial system operates, the higher the achievement of the goal of increasing the effectiveness of government institutions		
<b>Relevance of indicator</b>	<p>Literature: "An effective budget system must gather, classify, integrate and monitor useful, reliable and timely information for decision-making on public policies of any kind and for the discussion of public issues in any democratic scenario within transparency and accountability schemes (Cabrero and Rodríguez, 2012; Purón and Gil García, 2013)"</p> <p>Source: El impacto presupuestario de una política de drogas prohibicionista- Gabriel Puro-Cid, workbooks. Monitor 03.</p>		
<b>Indicator Coverage</b>	<p>North America:</p> <p>Mexico Central America &amp; Caribbean</p> <p>Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and Dominican Republic</p> <p>South America:</p> <p>Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela</p>		

## Statistical Annex

Better public health indices					
Key	sp1	sp2	sp3	sp4	sp5
Indicator	Overdose death	Prevalence of cannabis use among youth	Men who have sex with other men (active) with syphilis	Population living with HIV	Intentional self-harm, both sexes
Source	OAS	UNODC	WHO	UNAIDS	WHO
Year	2009	2013	2012	2015	2014
Unit of Measurement	Frequency	%	%	Number of people	Number of deaths
Countries					
Canada		28.3			3926
United States	0.42	33.7			42773
Mexico	1.96	2.4	10	0.0062	6215
Belize	1.77	24.3		0.0010	24
Costa Rica	0.63	16.8	13.7	0.0049	268
El Salvador	30.78	12.7	5.3	0.0031	487

Better public health indices					
Key	sp1	sp2	sp3	sp4	sp5
Indicator	Overdose death	Prevalence of cannabis use among youth	Men who have sex with other men (active) with syphilis	Population living with HIV	Intentional self-harm, both sexes
Guatemala	4.47	2	1.2	0.0028	513
Honduras		16.8	9.3	0.0044	94
Nicaragua	4.97	4.8	5.1	0.0060	351
Panama	3.37	6.2	30.4	0.0022	147
Antigua and Barbuda		32.6	10		
Bahamas	1.09	12.8	21.4	0.0004	5
Barbados	2.91	20.9		0.0011	
Cuba				0.0051	1454
Dominica	0.74	32.9			3
Grenada	0.37	19.7			
Haiti		3.2		0.0008	
Jamaica		21.1	15	0.0010	
Dominican Republic		1.7	12.9	0.0016	
St. Kitts and Nevis	0.52	24.24			2
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	1.02	26.7			2
St. Lucia	1.64	28.8			14
Trinidad and Tobago	0.81	16.6	8.9	0.0011	160
Argentina	2.47	18.3	20.1	0.00399	3248
Bolivia		6.2	20.3	0.0061	
Brazil	2.17	7.7	13.4	0.0025	10659
Chile	0.58	38.96		0.0055	1789
Colombia	2.81	31.2	3.3	0.0031	2074
Ecuador	3.74	0.5	6.5	0.0055	734
Guyana	3.68	7.2	10	0.0009	206
Paraguay	4.04	4.2		0.0040	383
Peru	13.37	4.3	21.2	0.0047	402
Surinam	0.65	7.7		0.0015	130
Uruguay	0.59	20.1		0.0034	601
Venezuela	4.01	6.1		0.0028	618

A state that maintains high levels of legitimacy.						
Key	ed1	ed2	ed3	ed4	ed5	ed6
Indicator	Confidence in the government	Democracy is preferable to any other form of government	I voted in the last presidential election	Transparency International rating	Freedom to participate in politics	World Press Freedom Ranking
Source	Latino-barómetro	Latino-barómetro	Latino-barómetro	Transparency International	Latino-barómetro	Reporters without borders
Year	2015	2015	2015	2016	2015	2015
Unit of Measurement	%	%	%	Rating	%	Rating
Countries						
Canada				82		15.26
United States				74		22.49
Mexico	19	48.4	71	30	52.9	49.33
Belize						20.61
Costa Rica	26.1	56.8	65.3	58	73.2	11.1
El Salvador	19.1	41.4	65.8	36	52.3	27.2
Guatemala	28.5	33.1	63.5	28	41.4	38.03
Honduras	28.2	40.1	70.2	30	54.6	44.62
Nicaragua	45.3	48.3	58.3	26	56.4	28.82
Panama	30.3	44.4	77.6	38	65.1	30.59
Antigua and Barbuda						
Bahamas				66		
Barbados				61		
Cuba				47		70.23
Dominica				59		
Grenada				56		
Haiti				20		24.66
Jamaica				39		12.45
Dominican Republic	43	63.3	75.3	31	77	27.9
St. Kitts and Nevis						
St. Vincent and the Grenadines				60		
St. Lucia				60		
Trinidad and Tobago				35		23.29
Argentina	32.1	70.1	86.1	36	73.9	25.09
Bolivia	42.1	64.5	87.2	33	53.4	31.78
Brazil	18.8	54.4	81.4	40	44.3	32.62
Chile	39.2	64.8	60.9	66	72	19.23
Colombia	25.4	55.4	67.6	37	53.2	44.11
Ecuador	44.3	70.7	88.5	31	61.5	33.21
Guyana				34		27.07
Paraguay	30.7	43.6	66.1	30	83.1	33.63

A state that maintains high levels of legitimacy.						
Key	ed1	ed2	ed3	ed4	ed5	ed6
Indicator	Confidence in the government	Democracy is preferable to any other form of government	I voted in the last presidential election	Transparency International rating	Freedom to participate in politics	World Press Freedom Ranking
Peru	20	55.9	84.4	35	56.3	29.99
Surinam				35		16.7
Uruguay	59.7	75.8	91.3	71	86.6	15.88
Venezuela	31.3	83.5	83.1	17	51.9	44.77

Low levels of economic and social costs.						
Code	ces1	ces2	ces3	ces5	Ces6	ces7
Indicator	Homicides	Political stability and absence of violence and terrorism	Economic cost of violence	Life expectancy	Protection from crime	Prison population
Source	World Bank	World Bank	IIEPC	World Bank	Latinobarómetro	International Centre for Prison Studies
Year	2012	2015	2015	2014	2015	2016
Unit of Measurement	Per 100,000 inhabitants		%	Years	%	Per 100,000 inhabitants
Countries						
Canada	1.563047571	93.81	3	81.95660976		114
United States	4.668148386	69.52	12	78.94146341		693
Mexico	21.541283	17.62	10	76.72185366	60.5	204
Belize	45.09472323	50.95		70.07743902		410
Costa Rica	8.430709456	63.81	6	79.40270732	44.10	352
El Salvador	41.4706412	45.71	17	72.75456098	71.3	541
Guatemala	34.57424777	23.81	10	71.72241463	56.7	122
Honduras	91.03941794	28.1	21	73.13570732	57.8	198
Nicaragua	11.33290485	46.19	5	74.81014634	37.3	171
Panama	17.19724905	59.52	9	77.59514634	53	426
Antigua and Barbuda	11.2252538	88.57		75.93763415		403
Bahamas	29.70478697	80.48		75.23365854		363
Barbados	7.774821133	96.67		75.49641463		322
Cuba	4.708829662	64.29	4	79.39082927		510
Dominica	8.404288021	90.95		76.59756098		300
Grenada	13.31233672	72.38		73.36631707		421
Haiti	10.16120246	21.9	4	62.74743902		102
Jamaica	39.06216553	51.9	12	75.6535122		145
Dominican Republic	22.03825273	53.33		73.50002439	46	232

Low levels of economic and social costs.						
Code	ces1	ces2	ces3	ces5	Ces6	ces7
Indicator	Homicides	Political stability and absence of violence and terrorism	Economic cost of violence	Life expectancy	Protection from crime	Prison population
St. Kitts and Nevis	33.425044	67.62		71.33658537		607
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	25.51362108	74.76		72.93685366		378
St. Lucia	21.5745336	74.76		75.04685366		327
Trinidad and Tobago	28.34316054	56.19	9	70.44056098		272
Argentina	7.033633747	44.76	4	76.15860976	63	160
Bolivia	12.09497495	36.19	4	68.344	55.5	122
Brazil	26.52083173	34.29	8	74.40187805	79.2	307
Chile	3.141413543	59.05	5	81.49619512	57.3	242
Colombia	30.71039649	12.38	18	73.99314634	61.8	240
Ecuador	12.41258302	42.38	7	75.8724878	47	162
Guyana	17.54590006		10	66.40641463		256
Paraguay	9.71527829	47.14	5	72.92170732	68.1	180
Peru	9.571618998	29.05	6	74.52553659	66.8	251
Surinam	9.280288487	55.24		71.15143902		183
Uruguay	7.929213382	82.86	5	76.98614634	42.7	291
Venezuela	25.51362108	13.81	12	74.23619512	74.4	159

Increase the production of evidence-based information for citizens on the phenomenon of drugs and their effects.		
Key	id2	id3
Indicator	"Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following statements? Legalization of marijuana use	People in prison for drug offenses
Source	Latinobarómetro	CEDD
Year	2015	2013
Unit of Measurement	%	Percentage of population in prison for drug offenses
Countries		
Canada		
United States		
Mexico	80	26.10
Belize		
Costa Rica	77.4	4.75
El Salvador	89.1	
Guatemala	91.3	
Honduras	89.1	


Increase the production of evidence-based information for citizens on the phenomenon of drugs and their effects.		
Key	id2	id3
Indicator	"Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following statements? Legalization of marijuana use	People in prison for drug offenses
Nicaragua	92.5	
Panama	83.8	
Antigua and Barbuda		
Bahamas		
Barbados		
Cuba		
Dominica		
Grenada		
Haiti		
Jamaica		
Dominican Republic	84.9	
St. Kitts and Nevis		
St. Vincent and the Grenadines		
St. Lucia		
Trinidad and Tobago		
Argentina	78.4	6.98
Bolivia	81.6	3.94
Brazil	78.1	138.20
Chile	39.9	
Colombia	79.3	23.14
Ecuador	90.8	6.47
Guyana		
Paraguay	85.6	
Peru	85.2	16.53
Surinam		
Uruguay	62.5	1.27
Venezuela	94.6	

Key Indicator	Weaken, control or neutralize organized crime.		
	co1 Illicit flow of financial resources	co2 Number of firearms seized by police	co5 “What do you consider to be the most important problem in the country?”
Source	Global Financial Integrity	UNODC	Latinobarómetro
Year	2004-2013	2013	2015
Unit of Measurement	Million USD (nominal)	Number of arms	%
Countries			
Canada			
United States			
Mexico	52844	0.085	29
Belize	129		
Costa Rica	11346		10.6
El Salvador	1744	0.008	42.4
Guatemala	2179	0.034	20.8
Honduras	4694		29.5
Nicaragua	3027		3
Panama	2104	0.021	25
Antigua and Barbuda	5		
Bahamas	1773		
Barbados	114		
Cuba			
Dominica	2		
Grenada	54		
Haiti	130		
Jamaica	636		
Dominican Republic	1458	0.149	26.7
St. Kitts and Nevis	5		
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	5		
St. Lucia	12		
Trinidad and Tobago	3666	0.029	
Argentina	7654	0.104	35.2
Bolivia	627		27.6
Brazil	22667	0.158	9.7
Chile	5500	0.143	17.5
Colombia	1475	0.012	11.7
Ecuador	2597	0.043	12.6
Guyana	285		
Paraguay	3750		24.6
Peru	4284	0.131	35.9
Suriname	760		
Uruguay	956	0.013	37.1

Weaken, control or neutralize organized crime.			
Key	co1	co2	co5
Indicator	Illicit flow of financial resources	Number of firearms seized by police	"What do you consider to be the most important problem in the country?"
Venezuela	12394		22.9

Increasing the effectiveness of government institutions.					
Key	gi1	gi2	gi3	gi4	gi5
Indicator	Companies have had at least one contact with a public official and paid a bribe, or been asked for a bribe in the previous 12 months	Corruption control	Unsentenced prison population	Public expenditure on health	Would you say you are satisfied with the performance of: The judicial system?
Source	UN	The Worldwide Governance Indicators	UN	CIDAD	Latinobarómetro
Year	2010	2014	2014	2005	2015
Unit of Measurement	%	Rating	% of prison population	% of GDP	%
Countries					
Canada		93.75	35.19	7.3	
United States		89.42	20.34	7.3	
Mexico	17.6	26.44	42.87	3.0	26.2
Belize	6.2	52.40		2.5	
Costa Rica	8.7	75.00	23.39	4.1	43.4
El Salvador	4.3	43.27	23.35	3.4	32.1
Guatemala	11.3	28.37	49.54	1.8	34.2
Honduras	8.1	23.56	52.88	2.5	36.1
Nicaragua	8.6	19.23	12.29	4.3	52.8
Panama	7.1	46.15	64.29	4.1	31.4
Antigua and Barbuda	6.9	74.04	46.09		
Bahamas	21.0	88.94	49.51	3.1	
Barbados	1.2	81.73		4.3	
Cuba		58.65			
Dominica	5.8	72.60	22.56	7.5	
Grenada	6.6	63.94	49.66	4.5	
Haiti		7.69	70.64	2.7	
Jamaica	19.3	43.75	19.08	1.1	
Dominican Republic	16.3	23.08	53.69	1.6	43.6
St. Kitts and Nevis	2.2	63.94	29.70	2.5	

Increasing the effectiveness of government institutions.					
Key	gi1	gi2	gi3	gi4	gi5
Indicator	Companies have had at least one contact with a public official and paid a bribe, or been asked for a bribe in the previous 12 months	Corruption control	Unsentenced prison population	Public expenditure on health	Would you say you are satisfied with the performance of: The judicial system?
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	4.9	72.60		4.3	
St. Lucia	11.6	67.31	40.85	3.5	
Trinidad and Tobago	10.5	33.65	55.90	1.1	
Argentina	10.3	33.17	49.99	4.4	30.5
Bolivia	10.7	29.81	83.66	4.2	24.5
Brazil	11.7	44.23	40.69	3.4	21.4
Chile	1.3	90.87	21.87	2.8	18.4
Colombia	2.2	42.79	31.74	3.4	28.4
Ecuador	1.7	21.15	44.39	2.0	42.7
Guyana	14.9	26.92	34.76	1.1	
Paraguay	31.5	13.94	70.92	2.3	22.8
Peru	15.9	32.69	54.51	1.2	22.2
Suriname	4.9	31.25		0.3	
Uruguay		89.90		2.8	46.1
Venezuela	10.3	4.81	73.23	1.7	24.1


**Figure 6.1 Ends-sp1-Best public health indices-directly related**

Source: Based on data from the Organization of American States (OAS)

According to the most recent data from the Organization of American States<sup>15</sup>, the highest overdose death rates, calculated per 100 thousand inhabitants in the countries of the region are found in: El Salvador with 30.78, followed by Peru with 13.37 and Nicaragua with 4.97. Conversely, the countries with the lowest rates are: St. Kitts & Nevis with 0.52, the United States with 0.42 and Grenada with 0.37. Of all the countries in the OAS, the average is 3.54 deaths.

<sup>15</sup> Data available for some countries vary, mainly because the national health agencies report data in different time periods. These countries are: St. Lucia 2003, 2005 Guyana, Peru, Saint Kitts & Nevis, Bahamas, Trinidad and Tobago, United States and Venezuela 2007, Barbados and Colombia 2008, Mexico and Nicaragua 2010. For other countries 2009 is used.

Figure 6.2 Ends-sp2-Best public health indices-directly related




Source: Compiled by the author using data from UNODC

According to the latest data<sup>16</sup> reported by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the average value in prevalence of cannabis use in the Americas among young people ages 13 to 17 years is 15.93%. The countries with the highest prevalence are: Chile with 38.96%, followed by the United States with 33.7% and Dominica with 32.9%. Meanwhile, countries with lowest prevalence are: Guatemala with 2%, Dominican Republic with 1.7% and Ecuador with 0.5%.

16 As in the previous case, the latest data available for the countries on the American continent are: 2003 Nicaragua, El Salvador, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Guatemala 2004, Canada, the United States, Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela and Puerto Rico 2005, Suriname 2006, Mexico and Dominican Republic 2008, Brazil 2010, Dominica 2011, Paraguay and Costa Rica 2012, Panama, Bolivia and Haiti 2014. For other countries the most recent data is from 2013.

Figure 6.3 Ends - sp3 - Best public health indices - Indirectly related




Source: Compiled by the authors based on data from the World Health Organization (WHO)

In another category related to public health, we have sexually transmitted diseases, specifically the indicator of men who have sex with other men. In this particular case, WHO<sup>17</sup> only has data available for 19 out of the 35 countries in the sample. Therefore, the average value of the continent shows that 12.52% of the male population engages in this practice. Countries with the highest percentage in this indicator are: Panama with 30.4%, Bahamas with 21.4% and Peru with 21.2 %. Countries with the lowest percentage are: Nicaragua 5.1%, Colombia with 3.3% and Guatemala with 1.2%.

There has been an increase in HIV, HBV, HCV, tuberculosis and sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) among illegal drug users due to high risk practices such as the use of contaminated or unsterilized syringes. In this respect, the joint United Nations program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) has the *population living with HIV indicator*, calculated per 100,000 inhabitants. The indicator can be interpreted as follows: the higher the number of people living with HIV, the lower the contribution being made to improving public health indices. Thus, data from 2015 indicate that the countries with the highest rates are: Mexico with 0.0062, followed by Bolivia with 0.0061 and Nicaragua with 0.0060. Those with the lowest rates are: Bahamas 0.0004, Haiti 0.0008 and Guyana 0.0009. The country average is .0031737.


17 For Argentina 2009, Bahamas 2013, Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Brazil 2010, Colombia Costa Rica, Ecuador, Jamaica and Guyana 2008, Nicaragua, Peru and Trinidad and Tobago 2011. For other countries, the year 2012 is used.

Figure 6.4 Ends - sp4 - Best public health indices - Indirectly related



Source: Compiled by the authors based on data from the United Nations Office on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)

Figure 6.5 Ends - sp5 - Best public health indices - Indirectly related




Source: Compiled by the authors based on data from the World Health Organization

One aspect indirectly related to drug use concerns people with mental health problems. For this indicator, WHO considers that the suicides recorded are part of the negative effects to which people with chronic or permanent mental

health problems are susceptible. To give some idea of the above, WHO<sup>18</sup> only has data on 28 out of the 35 countries. Those with the highest number of suicides were: the United States with 42,773 , Brazil with 10,659 and Mexico with 6,215. Countries with the lowest numbers registered were: Dominica 3 followed by St. Kitts & Nevis and St. Vincent and the Grenadines with 2. Of all the countries considered, the average is 13,364. These figures are the estimated number of deaths.

**Figure 6.6 Ends edr: A state that maintains high levels of legitimacy-Perception of legitimacy**




Source: Compiled by the authors based on data from Latinobarómetro

One of the indicators that largely explain the legitimacy of the state and its actions is confidence in the government. The data obtained from the survey conducted by Latinobarómetro in 2015 show that in response to the specific question “How much confidence do you have in the government?” The average value of confidence in Latin America is 32.39%, which is the combined total of the answers “a great deal of confidence and some confidence”. A look at the results by country shows that people in Uruguay have the greatest confidence with 59.7%, followed by Nicaragua with 45.3% and Ecuador with 44.3% . At the other end of the spectrum are: El Salvador with 19.1%, Mexico with 19% and Brazil with 18.8%.

18 Canada 2012, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Colombia, Venezuela 2013, Bahamas, St. Kitts and Nevis, Guayana 2012, Trinidad and Tobago 2010.

Figure 6.7 Ends ed2: A state that maintains high levels of legitimacy-Perception of legitimacy




Compiled by the authors based on data from Latinobarómetro 2015

Compiled by the authors based on data from Latinobarómetro 2015

Another question considered by Latinobarómetro is related to systems of government. One of the questions concerns democracy. Here are the overall results of *democracy is preferable to any other form of government* (2015). The values of “strongly agree and agree” are considered. Countries with the highest rates of agreement are:

Venezuela with 83.5%, Uruguay with 75.8% and Ecuador with 70.7%. Conversely, countries with the lowest rates of agreement are: El Salvador with 41.1%, Honduras with 40.1% and Guatemala with 33.1%. An average of 56.36% of the population in Latin American countries preferred this system of government over others. The data interpretation from the perspective that interests us in this research is: the higher the approval of the democratic regime, the higher the achievement of the goal of a legitimized state.

Figure 6.8 Ends-ed3- A state that maintains high levels of legitimacy-Perception of legitimacy



Source: Compiled by the authors based on data from Latinobarómetro 2015

Another indicator providing key information on how the state affects the construction of citizenship is related to the right to vote. The assumption of the democratic participation of the population in a country suggests that when this right is exercised, the state's legitimacy is fairly high. According to the data obtained from the latest survey conducted by Latinobarómetro in 2015, the countries with the highest percentage of participation are: Uruguay (91.3%), Ecuador (88.5%) and Bolivia (87.2%). Those with the lowest participation are Guatemala (63.5%), followed by Chile (60.9%) and Nicaragua in last position (58.3%). For the Latin American countries in the sample, the average is 56.3%

**Figure 6.9 Ends – ed4 – A state that maintains high levels of legitimacy-Perception of legitimacy**



Source: Compiled by the authors based on data from Transparency International

The *classification of perception of corruption* of Transparency International indicates the degree of corruption in the public sector according to the perceptions of the country's entrepreneurs and analysts, where 100 is the absence of corruption and 0 is a high perception of corruption. In 2016, the average score among countries on the American continent was 44.09. Countries that top the list are: Canada with 82, the United States with 74 and the South American country of Uruguay with 71. Countries with the most negative ratings are: Nicaragua with 26, Haiti with 20 and Venezuela with 17.


Figure 6.10 Ends ed5 - A state that maintains high levels of legitimacy – Acts that undermine confidence



Source: Compiled by the authors based on data from Latinobarómetro 2015

According to the results of Latinobarómetro (2015), “To what extent are the following freedoms, rights, opportunities and securities guaranteed in (country)? We specifically refer to the freedom to participate in politics. If we consider the sum of the values “completely and partly guaranteed”: Uruguay (86.6%), Paraguay (83.1%) and the Dominican Republic (77%) are the countries where political participation is perceived to be exercised without repercussions. Conversely, countries where this freedom is limited are: Venezuela (51.95%), Brazil (44.3%) and Guatemala (41.4%).


Figure 6.11 Ends - ed6 - A state that maintains high levels of legitimacy – Acts that undermine confidence



Source: Compiled by the authors based on data from Reporters Without Borders

Reporters Without Borders is an international nonprofit that promotes press freedom and the right to inform without retaliation. The organization has been active since 1985 and currently has a network of correspondents in 130 countries. Every year, it publishes the World Ranking of Freedom of the Press report, with metrics on how much freedom is enjoyed by countries on this issue. Understanding the results requires a reverse interpretation. In other words, the higher the score obtained, the less freedom and vice versa. That said, the findings of the 2015 report show that for the Americas, Cuba (70.23), Mexico (49.33) and Venezuela (44.77) scored highest, whereas Canada (15.26), Jamaica (1245) and Costa Rica (11.1) obtained the lowest scores. In the region as a whole, press freedom scored 29.65.

**Figure 6.12 Ends-ces 1-Low levels of economic and social costs-acts of violence**




Source: Compiled by the authors with data from The World Bank

Although it is difficult to link murders to drug trafficking, in countries like Mexico -where drug trafficking has existed for decades- killings and violence have occurred at strategic points on trafficking routes. This has dramatically increased the number of homicides in the country over the past ten years. Our assumption is that the higher the number of homicides, the more acute the problems of violence and crime arising from the phenomenon of illegal drugs. According to the World Bank (2012)<sup>19</sup> the average value of homicides in the Americas is 20.1. The countries with the highest number of murders registered are: Honduras with 91.03, Belize with 45.09 and El Salvador with 41.47. The countries with the lowest number are: the United States with 4.66, Chile with

<sup>19</sup> In the case of Cuba and Dominica, data from 2011 were reported.

3.14 and Canada with 1.56. Our interpretation for the analysis is: the higher the number of homicides registered, the lower the achievement of the goal of reducing social and economic costs.


Figure 6.13 Ends-ces 2-Low levels of economic and social costs-acts of violence



Source: Compiled by the authors with data from The World Bank

The indicator of political stability and absence of violence is one of the six groups of World Bank indicators measuring governance and good government at the international level. This is estimated through the perception of the possibility that governments could be destabilized by violent or unconstitutional means such as internal violence or international terrorism. Opinion leaders and specialists were asked two questions: How does the risk of political violence influence government? Does the threat of terrorism translate into costs for businesses? Results are graded on a scale of 0 to 100, where higher scores mean greater political stability and an absence of violence. At the regional level, North America scored 84 while Latin America and the Caribbean scored 58 in 2015. In particular, Colombia, Venezuela and Mexico scored lowest with 12.38, 13.81 and 17.62 respectively. Conversely, Barbados, Canada and Dominica, have ratings above ninety with 96.67, 93.81 and 90.95 respectively.

Figure 6.14 Ends-ces 1-Low levels of economic and social costs-economic costs




Source: Compiled by the authors with data from The World Peace Index

According to the Peace Index 2015, drawn up by the Institute for Economics and Peace, the average value of the **estimated cost of violence** in countries on the American Continent is 8.58% in relation to GDP. The indicator is estimated on the basis of calculations of direct or indirect violence. Direct costs are attributable to violence, whereas indirect costs are related to economic redirection to prevent or address violence. For example, some indirect economic costs of violence include medical expenses derived from homicides, insurance premiums paid, extortion fees paid by individuals, businesses and families, as well as expenditure on security systems. Countries with the highest estimate are Honduras with 21%, followed by Colombia with 18% and El Salvador with 17%. Conversely, Canada (3%), Bolivia and Argentina (4%) have the lowest costs due to violence.


According to several analysts, the loss of life expectancy is partly related to the risks arising from the phenomenon of illegal drugs. In other words, the higher the intrinsic risks of the phenomenon, the lower the population's life expectancy. In this respect, the assumption underlying the choice of this indicator to be part of the platform is that the higher the population's life expectancy in the various countries, the more effectively one of the social costs of the illegal drug phenomenon is being reduced. Based on data from the World Bank (2014), the average life expectancy for the American Continent is 74.32 years. Countries that are below average are Haiti with 62.75, Guyana with 66.41 and Bolivia with 68.34, while countries with the highest life expectancy are Canada with 81.9, Chile with 81.4 and Costa Rica with 79.4.

Figure 6.15 Ends-ces5-Low levels of economic and social costs-Social costs



Source: Compiled by the authors with data from The World Bank

Figure 6.16 Ends-ces6-Low levels of economic and social costs-Social costs




Source: Compiled by the authors based on data from Latinobarómetro

Governments’ current decisions and policies have entailed political and economic costs. They have also created an atmosphere of a growing perception of insecurity. Clashes between security forces and criminal groups are an example of how government decisions color citizens’ perception of (in) security. Another example are the practices of criminal groups such as extortion, kidnapping, killings and alleged links with local police to operate in localities. This has created a hostile environment and above all, recognition of the power of criminal

organizations. According to the results of Latinobarómetro 2015, answers to the question: *“To what extent are the following freedoms, rights, opportunities and securities guaranteed in (country)? Protection against crime”* show that in Brazil (79.2%), Venezuela (74.4%) and El Salvador (71.3%) there is a widespread perception that the government fails to guarantee proper protection from organized crime. Conversely, Costa Rica (44.1%), Uruguay (42.7%) and Nicaragua (37.3%) have the highest perception of this protection.


Figure 6.17 Ends – ces7 – Low levels in economic and social costs– Social costs



Source: Compiled by the authors with data from the International Centre for Prison Studies

According to the International Centre for Prison Studies (2016) the largest number of prison population per 100,000 inhabitant in the Americas are found in the United States, St. Kitts & Nevis and El Salvador with 693, 607 and 541 respectively. Conversely, countries with the lowest prison populations are Bolivia with 122, Canada with 114 and Haiti with 102. From the data obtained for sample countries, the average is 290.4. This indicator is key for future analyses, because in general, it shows the evolution of the prison population over time and can be linked to particular contexts where drug policy has been reformulated, since the assumption behind this indicator points to the reduction of the prison population if there were a less punitive regulatory framework that encouraged the flow of evidence-based information.

Figure 6.18 Means-id2-Increase the production of evidence-based information for citizens on the drug phenomenon and its effects. -Perception



Source: Compiled by the authors based on data from Latinobarómetro 2015

The stigmatization and criminalization of psychoactive substance users has led users to be associated with acts of vandalism and suffer from job discrimination. Moreover, stigmatization due to the use of illegal drugs can cause fear or embarrassment among users. In public health terms, prohibition prevents proper medical care. The results of the question asked by Latinobarómetro in 2015: *Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following statements? Legalization of marijuana use* show that the countries with the highest level of disagreement about legalization are Venezuela with 94.6%, Nicaragua with 93.5% and Guatemala with 91.3%. Conversely, countries with the highest levels of acceptance are Costa Rica with 77.4%, Uruguay with 62.5% and Chile with 39.9%. Of the countries considered for analysis, the average is 81.33%.

Figure 6.19 Means-id3-Increase the production of evidence-based information for citizens on the drug phenomenon and its effects. -Judicial institutions




Source: Compiled by the authors based on data from the Collective on Drug Studies and Law (CEDD)

Prohibitionist drug policy has traditionally criminalized users for possession of substances without their actually being guilty of a felony. National justice systems currently consider the use and possession of drugs as criminal behavior and even a penal offense. This led to an annual increase in the number of people arrested and subject to punitive legal trials. The Collective on Drug Studies and Law has solid empirical research with data from nine Latin American countries. In 2013, the percentage of the prison population for drug-related

offenses is highest in Brazil with 38.20%, Mexico with 26.10% and Colombia with 23.13%. Conversely, Costa Rica (4.75%), Bolivia (3.94%) and Uruguay (1.27%) are the countries with the lowest percentage of people in prison for drug-related offenses.

**Figure 6.20 Means-to-Weaken, control or neutralize organized crime.-Illegal flows of resources**




Source: Compiled by the authors based on data from Global Financial Integrity

The estimated illegal financial flows of organized crime groups are calculated in millions of dollars and consider the following: tax evasion, money laundering, bribery and false commercial invoicing (fraud), the latter being the most recurrent illegal activity in developing countries. Mexico ranks as the Latin American country with the greatest flow of illicit financial resources with \$52,844.00, followed by Brazil with \$22,667.00 and Venezuela with \$12,394.00. Countries with the lowest flow are St. Kitts & Nevis with \$5, St. Vincent & the Grenadines with \$5 and Dominica with \$2. For the purposes of analysis of this research, the higher the amount of illicit flows, the less the weakening of organized crime.


Although not all homicides with firearms are carried out by organized crime groups, it is possible to identify a *modus operandi* that characterizes executions by these groups. For example, the most popular firearms include the AK-47, better known as the goat horn, the Bushmaster .223 rifle, and the Colt Super .38, among others. A useful proxy for estimating the size and scope of measures that counteract the weakening of organized crime is weapons seizure. According to UNODC (2013), countries with the largest numbers of firearms seized are Brazil 0.158, Dominican Republic 0.149 and Chile 0.143, while those with the lowest number of seizures are: Uruguay with 0.013, Colombia with 0.012 and El Salvador with 0.008. These figures are calculated per 100 thousand inhabitants.

Figura 6.21 Means - co2 - Weaken, control or neutralize organized crime – illegal resources flow



Source: Compiled by the author using data from UNODC


Figure 6.22 Means-co5-Weaken, control or neutralize organized crime. Organization



Source: Compiled by the authors based on data from Latinobarómetro

The existence of several organized crime groups poses a greater risk for peace and collective security. Many research projects indicate that the struggle waged by the state against these groups has increased the population’s perception of the de facto power exercised by these groups. The results of the questions included: “What do you think is the country’s main problem?” in Latinobarómetro. The responses considered are those who claim that drug trafficking and crime is the country’s most important problem. In this regard, the countries where it is thought to be the main problem are El Salvador with 42.4%, Uruguay with 37.1% and Peru with 35.9%. At the opposite end of the scale are Costa Rica with 10.6%, Brazil with 9.7% and Nicaragua with 3%.

**Figure 6.23 Ends-giri-Increasing the effectiveness of government institutions.**  
**Accountability**




Source: Compiled by the authors using data from the UN

One of the issues that creates the greater discontent among the population is corruption, especially and most acutely in countries with high levels of economic and social inequality. Corruption is an effect of government administrations lacking transparency and accountability. A direct relationship can often be seen between corruption and trust in government and its institutions. The indicator of the involvement in acts of corruption therefore provides information on how often officials or public servants resort to this practice either to expedite government administrative processes, avoid sanctions or simply for personal financial gain even if this means breaking the law. A common example of this phenomenon related to illegal drugs occurs in Mexico: organized crime groups systematically bribe police forces in order to be able to operate in a certain area.

A number of sources provide information and hard data on the subject, such as the United Nations, which compiles information reported by national governments' statistical offices. This source was considered since it is one of the objectives currently considered for the 2030 Agenda. It is provided by reliable institutions and was chosen as one of the global indicators presented here. Although this indicator only presented one trait of corruption, it serves as a proxy which, together with the others, provides a clearer picture of institutions' actual efficiency. In regards to countries in the Americas, Paraguay, Bahamas and Jamaica have the highest percentage of involvement in acts of corruption with 31%, 21% and 19.3% respectively. Conversely, the countries with the lowest incidence of acts of corruption are Ecuador with 1.7%, Chile with 1.3% and Barbados with 1.2%, according to 2010 data. The assumption behind the

choice of this indicator is that the higher the percentage of involvement in acts of corruption, the lower the efficiency of and confidence in institutions.


**Figure 6.24 Ends-giri-Increasing the effectiveness of government institutions - Accountability**



Source: Compiled by the authors based on data from Worldwide Governance Indicators

The corruption control indicator, drawn up by the World Bank, is included as one of the indicators for governance worldwide. As opposed to the indicator for involvement in acts of corruption, this is a composite indicator that considers acts of both administrative corruption (small) and illicit enrichment (large) and the capture of the state and conflicts of interest. The sources used to construct this indicator are 31 internationally renowned institutions including Transparency International, *The Economist* and the World Bank. Once the calculation has been made, the result obtained is converted to a score ranging from 0 to 100 to facilitate interpretation. For this indicator, data from all the countries included in the sample were obtained. The average score for the continent as a whole is 48.88, in other words, a failing grade. The top-rated countries are Canada, Chile and Uruguay with 93.7, 90.87 and 89.9, while those with the lowest rating are Paraguay with 13.94, Haiti with 7.69 and Venezuela with 4.81. Our assumption is simple: the more corruption is controlled, the greater the effectiveness of institutions.


Figur 6.25 Ends-gj3-Increasing the effectiveness of government institutions.



Source: Compiled by the authors using data from the UN

Judicial systems face major challenges, including the compilation of research folders and resolutions issued by the competent authorities depending on the type of crime being sentenced. Lack of human resources, limited capacities or rigid structures often results in high levels of overcrowding in prisons or the erosion of institutions due to the lack of prompt, expeditious justice. A useful indicator for determining the effectiveness of judicial systems is that of the unsentenced prison population. According to 2010 data from the United Nations, the highest percentage of unsentenced prison population is found in Bolivia with 83.66%, followed by Venezuela with 73.23% and Paraguay with 70.92%. This is no small matter, since in addition to highlighting the poor performance of its justice system, it has perverse effects on prison users, since they often end up consolidating criminal networks inside prisons rather than joining social reintegration programs. The countries that performed best in this indicator are the United States, Jamaica and Nicaragua, with only 20.34%, 19.08% and 12.29% of unsentenced prison populations. The regional average is 43.70%. This suggests that much remains to be done to improve the performance of justice institutions. Several studies show that the vast majority of the prison population are people criminalized by the law for the use or possession of small amounts of illegal drugs. This represents an opportunity to reform the law so that it is more appropriate particularly on this issue and thereby facilitate the processes of justice.


Figure 6.26 Ends-gi4-Increasing the effectiveness of government institutions-Use of resources



Source: Based on data from the Center for Development Research

In public finance, resources often create rivalry between the various government sectors. In other words, the higher the budget earmarked for an issue on the national agenda, the fewer resources will be available for other items on the agenda. This is one of the basic premises on which we based our analysis of the illegal drug phenomenon and the way it is defined in different countries in the Americas. As long as the definition of the problem and intervention strategies are based on a prohibitionist view, in which the police and the armed forces use the majority of public resources, the less money will be available for public health programs to prevent and treat people who are problem users of illegal drugs. To put this in perspective, we chose the indicator of countries' public health expenditure in relation to their gross domestic product and found that: Dominica allocates 7.5% and both Canada and the United States assign 7.3%, making them the countries with the highest percentage for this category. Countries that earmark the lowest percentage are located in the Caribbean: Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago with 1.1% respectively and Suriname with 0.3%. These calculations are based on data from the Center for Development Research (CIDAD). Data was unavailable for just two out of the sample of 35 countries, while the average public health expenditure is 3.21%.

**Figure 6.27 Ends-gis-Increasing the effectiveness of government institutions-Use of resources**



Source: Compiled by the authors based on data from Latinobarómetro

According to the 2015 results of the survey conducted by Latinobarómetro on satisfaction with the way the judicial system works, the Latin American countries with the best perception of its performance are: Nicaragua with 52.8%, Uruguay with 46.1% and the Dominican Republic with 43.6%. This percentage was calculated by combining the responses: "Very satisfied" and "quite satisfied". Countries where it is perceived that the judicial system performs poorly are Peru with 22.2%, Brazil with 21.4% and Chile with 18.4%. One should recall that the data obtained from this source only consider a total of 18 countries, in which the average perception of satisfaction is 32.27%.

La impresión de *Drug Policy in the Americas: a redefinition of the problem and the state's role* estará a cargo de Editorial Pandora (<http://pandoraimpresores.com>), mayo de 2017, con un tiraje de 200 ejemplares impresos en papel cultural de 120grs. Portada impresa en selección de color en papel couché de 300grs.  
Encargado de la edición: David Aguilar Vázquez

# **Drug Policy in the Americas:**

a redefinition of the problem  
and the state's role

**Working document No.1, 2017**



# Drug Policy in the Americas:

A redefinition of the problem and the state's role

